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Abstract

resource sharing. SPKI does incorporate a notion of authentication as well: its linked local
namespaces bind keys to names. This notion of
authentication is more general than conventional
hierarchical PKI naming, allowing it to escape
the “trusted-root” problem.
Unfortunately, SPKI is not founded on a formal semantics that can provide intuition for
what it does, what it promises, what it assumes,
and how it may or may not be safely extended.
Abadi, Lampson, and others deﬁned an authorization system called the Calculus for Access
Control [ABLP93, LABW92]. This system provides delegation without restrictions. A user can
encode restrictions by delegating control over
“self as role” to another user, and adding the
principal “self as role” to the ACL of the resource to be shared. The system is based on a
formal semantics that explains how delegations
interact with various combination operators for
principals. Our formalism for SPKI is based on
the semantics of the Calculus for Access Control, extended to support restricted delegation
and SPKI names.
Our formal treatment of SPKI is attractive for
two reasons:
First, it supplies intuition for what SPKI operations mean. The proliferation of concrete concepts in SPKI can be understood as applications
of just three abstractions: principal, statement,
and name.

We extend the logic and semantics of authorization due to Abadi, Lampson, et al. to support restricted delegation. Our formal model provides
a simple interpretation for the variety of constructs in the Simple Public Key Infrastructure
(SPKI), and lends intuition about possible extensions. We discuss both extensions that our
semantics supports and extensions that it cautions against.

1

Introduction

This paper provides a formal semantics for the
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI), an Internet Experimental Protocol [EFL+ 99]. The
current (2.0) version of SPKI is a merger of SPKI
1.0 and the Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) 1.0.
SPKI is an elegant practical system that addresses the problem of ensuring that a user is
authorized to perform an action, not just the
problem of identifying the user. This focus allows for much more ﬂexible sharing of resources
through delegation; in contrast, systems based
on authentication with a conventional publickey infrastructure (PKI) plus authorization with
conventional ACLs limit the available modes of
∗
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mal model that describes what a principal means
when it delegates authority.

Second, the formalism gives us guidance in extending SPKI. We give an example of a dangerous extension that the formalism advises against,
and we give examples of extensions that the formalism supports and that we use in our concrete
system implementation.
We begin in Section 2 by discussing related
formalisms. We then provide a quick overview
of modal logic and possible-worlds semantics in
Section 3, followed by reviews of the original Calculus for Access Control and SPKI in Sections 4
and 5. In Section 6, we describe our extension
to the Calculus for Access Control and our extensions to its semantics to support restricted
delegation. Section 7 further extends the formalism to support SPKI linked local names, and
discusses the shortcomings of Abadi’s semantics
for SPKI names. We model SPKI tags in Section 8. In Section 9, we use the work from the
prior two sections to construct a formal scaﬀolding under SPKI, and we discuss some of the interesting ramiﬁcations of our formalism. We summarize our contributions in Section 10. Proofs
appear in the appendix.

2
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Review: the logic of belief
The Sicilian smiled and stared at the wine
goblets. “Now a great fool,” he began,
“would place the wine in his own goblet,
because he would know that only another
great fool would reach first for what he was
given. I am clearly not a great fool, so I
will clearly not reach for your wine.”
“That’s your final choice?”
“No. Because you knew I was not a great
fool, so you would know that I would never
fall for such a trick. You would count on it.
So I will clearly not reach for mine either.”

[Gol73, p. 157]
The Sicilian’s great eﬀort went into reasoning
about the beliefs of his opponent, including his
opponent’s beliefs about his own beliefs, and so
on. His watertight reasoning is an example of
modal logic, the logic of belief. One way to reason about permissions and sharing is to reason
about who believes what. We call participants
in a distributed system agents, and the symbols that represent agents in logical expressions
principals. Principals can also represent sets of
agents, or one agent quoting another; these are
called compound principals, and we discuss them
in Section 3.1. If Alice believes everything Bob
believes (that is, Alice trusts Bob in every matter), then if Bob believes it is good to read a
given ﬁle, Alice must believe the same. In this
section, we develop a model for reasoning about
logic in the presence of belief.
We begin with propositional logic. Assume
there is a set of primitive (uninterpreted, independent) statements Σ.1 For our purposes of
access control, we consider primitive statements
such as “it is good to write to ﬁle X.” This interpretation turns an imperative command into
a declarative proposition. The primitive statements may be connected with and (∧) and not
(¬) to form arbitrary formulas. The or (∨)

Related work

Abadi provides a semantics for SPKI names in
[Aba98], but its deﬁnition shares a ﬂaw with that
used for roles in [ABLP93]. We discuss Abadi’s
name semantics in Section 7.3.
Halpern and van der Meyden supply an alternate semantics for SPKI names in [HvdM99],
but it only encompasses the containment relation among names, and does not treat names as
principals. As a result, it cannot relate names to
compound principals nor relate names to other
principals that are only connected by a restricted
delegation.
Aura supplies a semantics for SPKI restricted
delegation in [Aur98], but it is unsatisfying in
that it essentially says what the reduction procedure says: a delegation is in place if there is a
chain of delegation certiﬁcates and principals. It
does not lend intuition about what the delega1
tions mean. In contrast, our semantics connects
Figure 3 provides a table of sets and variable notation
restricted delegation to the logic of belief, a for- used in this paper.
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and implies ( ;) operators are abbreviations for
longer formulas made of ∧ and ¬.
Next we introduce a modal operator
believes .2 If σ is a formula and principal
A represents agent Alice, A believes σ is a
formula that can be read “Alice believes σ
is true.” In time, we will introduce multiple
believes operators, one per principal. For
now, we would like to build a model that helps
us understand which formulas A believes; that
is, for which σ do we have A believes σ?
To model this logic, we build a Kripke structure. A Kripke structure is a tuple of sets
M = W, I, J. The members of set W represent
possible worlds. The function I maps a primitive proposition (s) to the set of worlds where
it is true, and the function J maps a principal
to a relation on worlds in W . Together, I and J
determine the truth value of every formula in every world in W ; we describe them in more detail
shortly.
First, some intuition: A principal A living in
world w0 considers some other set of worlds possible, and if a formula σ is true in each of those
other worlds, then A believes the formula. The
interesting thing about possible worlds is that
the set of worlds A considers possible captures
what she does not know: if a statement σ appears in one possible world and ¬σ appears in
another, then A knows neither σ nor ¬σ. As far
as she is concerned, σ could go either way, because A cannot tell which of the possible worlds
she actually is in.
When we write M, w0 |= σ (pronounced “M
at w0 models σ”), we mean that in model M at
world w0 , the formula σ is true. The mapping
I tells us immediately about the truth of primitive propositions at diﬀerent worlds, but we wish
to determine the truth of arbitrary statements
σ, including propositional connectives and our
modal operators (σ = A believes τ ). We illustrate with an example structure, shown in Figure 1.
The model contains three primitive statements, l, b, and p. The statement l means that

our agent Alice (A) is in the produce department of a grocery store. Its negation, ¬l, means
that Alice is in the meat department (it’s a small
store). The b primitive means that the store’s
bananas are yellow, and the p primitive means
that the store’s pork is fresh.
Recall the three parts of a model, W, I, J.
W is the set of possible worlds; in our case,
since there are three primitive statements, there
are at most eight: W = {w0 , w1, . . . w7 }. I
is a relation that deﬁnes which primitive statements are true at which worlds. In our example,
I(b) = {w0 , w1, w4, w5 }, since the bananas are
only yellow in those four worlds. Finally, J is a
function that maps principals to relations. Because we have only one principal (Alice), J has
only one mapping, written J(A). The relation
J(A) is depicted with arrows in the diagram. For
example, w0, w1  ∈ J(A); that is, when the actual world is w0 , w1 is a world Alice considers
possible. In our example, it happens that Alice
considers two worlds possible from each world.
Assume for a moment that the actual world is
in fact w0 : Alice is in the produce department,
the bananas are yellow and the pork is fresh. If
Alice were omniscient, she would consider only
w0 possible, for that is indeed the state of things.
Alice, however, is merely a shopper. She cannot
see from the produce department what is going
on in the meat department, and thus she cannot
tell if the pork is fresh. She must also consider
possible world w1 , where the pork is spoiled. She
knows for certain her own location, though, so
she can ignore worlds w4 · · · w7 . Because she is
in the produce department and can see the bananas, she can also ignore worlds w2 and w3 in
which the bananas are green.
We have explained the two arrows emanating
from world w0 . The other arrows in the diagram,
comprising the relation J(A), communicate the
same sort of information about any other state
of aﬀairs. For example, if the actual world were
w1 (the pork is in fact spoiled), Alice considers
just the same worlds w0 and w1 possible, and for
the same reasons.
Now that you have the intuition behind the
2
Kripke
structure, we can formally deﬁne when
In conventional modal logic, A believes σ is written
2A σ.
various statements are true. Primitive proposi3
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Figure 1: A model of eight worlds (circles), illustrating the relationship between the accessibility
relation (arrows) and the the modal operator (A believes ).

tions are easy: the casual deﬁnition of I above Not surprisingly, ¬σ holds in exactly those
worlds where σ does not, and σ ∧ τ holds in exbecomes:
actly those worlds where both subformulas hold.
when w0 ∈ I(s)
M, w0 |= s
Take a look at the example structure and conThis deﬁnition can be read “Statement s is true vince yourself that E(b ∧ ¬p) = {w1 , w5 }.
at world w0 in model M when w0 is in the set
I(s).”
What about formulas constructed from the
propositional connectives ∧ and ¬? The truth of
some complex formula σ in a world is completely
determined by the truth of its primitive propositions, which the model deﬁnes by the mapping I.
So we can formally deﬁne an extension function
E to extend the deﬁnition of I to arbitrary formulas. E is deﬁned recursively starting with I,
and extends as you would expect for the propositional connectives:

We embarked on this journey to discover when
Alice believes various statements, so we need to
ﬁnd out when the model supports formulas including our modal belief operator. The natural
intuition is that Alice should believe a statement
whenever it is true in every world Alice considers
possible. To recall our example, b is true (the bananas are yellow) in every world Alice considers
possible from w0 , so M, w0 |= A believes b. But
because Alice considers w0 and w1 possible, she
considers both p and ¬p possible; and so she can
believe neither; hence we have ¬(A believes p)
and ¬(A believes ¬p) at world w0 . (You can
think of this situation as representing Alice’s “silence” on the matter of p. Even though Alice asserts neither p nor ¬p, every formula is assigned

E(s) = I(s)
E(¬σ) = W − E(σ)
E(σ ∧ τ ) = E(σ) ∩ E(τ )
4

a truth value. It is just that both A believes p
and A believes ¬p are false.)
With this intuition, we ﬁll out the deﬁnition
of E to mention formulas containing our modal
operator A believes :

That set union operation is surprising! What’s
going on? Recall that the more worlds an agent
considers possible, the less the agent believes. In
our example structure, Alice could not believe p
because she considered world w1 possible, where
p was false. Likewise, by taking the union of
the relations for principals A and B to get the
relation for the compound principal A ∧ B, we
ensure that the compound principal is at least
as ignorant as either of A or B. If A and B
disagree on any statement σ, then A ∧ B can see
both worlds where σ is true and worlds where it
is false, so A ∧ B can have neither belief.
The second operator for forming compound
principals is written B|A, and pronounced “B
quoting A.” (“Quoting” may seem an odd choice
of words when talking about belief; however,
when we translate our terminology into that of
Lampson et al., it reads more naturally.) This
principal captures B’s beliefs about A’s beliefs:
(B|A) believes σ should be synonymous with
B believes (A believes σ).
The relation for the compound principal B|A
is the composition of the relations of B and A:

E(A believes σ) = {w|J(A)(w) ⊆ E(σ)}
J(A)(w) denotes the set of worlds that A considers possible from w.3 So when σ is true in every
one of these worlds (i.e., J(A)(w) ⊆ E(σ)), then
A believes σ (i.e. A believes σ).
Of course, security is not very interesting in
a world with only one agent. To introduce a
second principal, we simply add a new relation J(B) to our model. Now we can reason
about what Bob believes (B believes σ), and
even about what Alice believes about what Bob
believes (A believes B believes σ). (In our example, we could certainly discuss Alice’s beliefs
about her own beliefs, but for our application to
access control, that is not very interesting.)

3.1

Compound principals

R(B|A) = R(B) ◦ R(A)

It is also possible to talk about compound principals. Lampson et al. deﬁne two operators on
principals that can be used to make new compound principals. The ﬁrst is fairly easy to describe: the principal A ∧ B believes only things
that both A and B believe. We can deﬁne a new
possible-worlds relation for the compound principal in terms of the relations for A and B. To do
this, we extend the mapping J to a new mapping
R whose domain includes compound principals.
Like the deﬁnition of E, R is deﬁned recursively
starting with J:

What is the intuition for using composition?
Suppose we have M, w0 |= B|A believes σ: At
world w0 , Bob (agent B) believes Alice believes
σ. That means that at every world Bob considers possible from w0 (R(B)(w0)), Alice believes
σ. But Alice only believes σ at those worlds if σ
is true at every world Alice can see from those
worlds:

R(A)(w )
w ∈R(B)(w0)

R(A) = J(A)

The composition R(B) ◦ R(A) relates w0 to just
this set. So B|A believes σ is true at w0 exactly
when σ is true in every world reachable from
w0 by the composited relation given above as
R(B|A).

∀ primitive principals A
R(A ∧ B) = R(A) ∪ R(B)
∀ arbitrary principals A, B
And R replaces J’s role in the deﬁnition of E:

3.1.1

E(A believes σ) = {w|R(A)(w) ⊆ E(σ)}
3



The nature of principal relations

Now that we have a formal structure for discussing the beliefs of principals, let us consider



Formally, J (A)(w) = {w |w, w  ∈ J (A)}.

5

believes everything Bob believes, then Alice does
not have to be present for Bob to read one of her
ﬁles: if Bob claims that reading the ﬁle would
be good, Alice must agree, and the ﬁle server
grants the request. To capture this trust, we observe that Alice is “less ignorant” than Bob: she
believes everything Bob believes, and then perhaps more (on which Bob may remain silent).
Therefore, from any actual world, Alice should
consider possible a subset of the worlds Bob considers possible. When R(A) ⊆ R(B), Alice says
everything Bob says; if she says even more, it is
because she disregards some possible world that
leaves Bob’s belief ambiguous. You should convince yourself that if Bob believes σ, Alice has
to believe the same thing, for she considers possible only a subset of the worlds Bob considers
possible.

what kinds of beliefs are reasonable, and how
principals’ beliefs should be related to one another’s.
Recall our example structure, where in any
world, Alice was either ignorant (had no belief)
about either the pork or ignorant about the bananas. The ﬁrst observation is that agents do
not need to believe every true thing; statements
about which they have neither a positive nor a
negative belief represent something the agent is
ignorant about.
Furthermore, observe that Alice never believed anything false:
in every world, if
A believes σ, σ also held in that world. In the
parlance of modal logic, we would say Alice’s
belief is actually knowledge: although she does
not have all knowledge, everything she believes
is in fact true. Why was this the case? Notice
that Alice’s possible-worlds relation is reﬂexive:
for every world Alice’s relation includes an edge
pointing back to that world. That is why Alice
cannot believe anything false. If σ is not true
in a given world, Alice cannot believe σ there,
because the deﬁnition

4

This section contains an introduction to the Calculus for Access Control due to Abadi, Lampson,
et al.The reader familiar with it may skip to the
next section. We have preserved here the names
used for formulas in [LABW92]. We explicitly
name formulas L1–L3, which are mentioned in
passing in [LABW92, p. 273], and formulas A1–
A4, which are mentioned in [ABLP93, pp. 712,
714, and 718].
In the preceding section, we introduced an instance of modal logic: propositional logic plus
some modal operators capture the possibly ignorant, possibly false beliefs of fallible principals. The semantics we presented, based on
Kripke structures, is exactly that used by Abadi
to justify the calculus for access control. We
introduced the semantics ﬁrst, though, because
conventionally the semantics is the “intuitive
model” of the world, and the logic is a system for
discovering theorems (statements that are true
in every model) and reasoning from premises to
conclusions that must appear in the model.
To apply modal logic to access control, Abadi
et al. rename the operators. First, “believes” is
renamed “says.” This is meant to capture the

M, w |= A believes σ iﬀ w ∈ E(A believes σ)
iﬀ R(A)(w) ⊆ E(σ)
precludes it.
In modeling access control in the presence
of arbitrary principals, however, we should certainly expect that some principals will believe (or
at least claim to believe) untrue things. So we
make no restriction of reﬂexivity on the relation
that deﬁnes a principal’s beliefs. Indeed, a principal may have an empty relation at a world: it
may consider no worlds possible! In that case, at
that world, the agent considers every statement
true, since every statement is true in all of the
zero worlds the agent considers possible. Indeed,
the agent believes false. The agent’s reasoning
has become inconsistent; other agents would be
wise not to follow this agent’s beliefs.
3.1.2

Review: the original Calculus for Access Control

Trust

Agents following one another’s beliefs is exactly
how we model trust. If Alice establishes that she
6

We also have the Distribution Axiom (known
in modal logic as the axiom K, from which the
name of the system Kn derives):

notion that the logic is performative: sometimes
when a principal says something, that something
becomes true. The act of saying to a ﬁleserver
that a ﬁle should be modiﬁed, given that the ﬁleserver believes you, causes that ﬁle to indeed be
modiﬁed. This renaming makes the quoting operator sound more natural: B|A is Bob quoting
Alice. B|A says s is meant to be a synonym for
B says A says s. “Belief” is still useful intuition,
however. The operator is the same; Bob’s belief in σ can be inherited by Alice without Alice
actually uttering σ.
A logic is a system of axioms and proof rules
that let one reason from premises to conclusions:
if the premise holds in a model, the conclusion
holds as well. The logic of the Calculus is sound
in that any conclusion proven in the logic holds
in the model, but it is not complete: there are
statements that are true in every model that cannot be proven in the logic. Abadi suggests that in
fact the model may be undecidable: no logic system is adequate to prove every valid statement
of the model.
The logic of access control is the same (up
to variations in notation) as the conventional
modal logic system Kn . The subscript n indicates that there are multiple modal operators
[HC96, FHMV95, p. 51]. We present that system
here.
First, we write  σ if a statement σ is valid in
the logic: either taken as an axiom, or provable
as a theorem from other axioms and the proof
rules. We prove theorems using the following:

 A says (σ

;(A says σ

;A says τ )

(Axiom S3)
Intuitively it means that agents understand and
believe all of the consequences of their beliefs.
Furthermore, they believe every theorem:
∀A,

σ
 A says σ

(Rule S4)

That is, agents know all of the theorems of the
logic.
There is a subtle but important distinction between implication in the metalogic (the proof
rule above) and implication in the logic. The
logical symbol  means that the premises on its
left prove the conclusions on its right. The proof
rule condition  σ means that no premises are required to prove σ; that is, σ is a theorem. When
that is true, we may conclude  A says σ: it is
proven that A says σ.
In contrast, the corresponding statement in
the logic (not the metalogic) does not hold. The
statement  σ ;A says σ is read “it is not provable that σ implies A says σ.” The premise of
the implication is an arbitrary statement σ (unlike the theorem  σ in the proof rule); it is not
true that principals say every true statement.
They say every theorem (those statements true
in every world), but not every true statement
(those statements true in the actual world from
which the statement is being uttered).

If σ is a tautology of propositional calculus,
then  σ

;τ )

(Axiom S1)

4.1

The calculus of principals

The axiom lets us pull in the theorems of propoThe symbol = is an equivalence relation on prinsitional calculus without explicitly mentioning
cipals; by A = B we mean that A and B have
the axioms and proof rules that produce them.
the same relation and therefore the same beliefs.4
;
σ
 σ τ
(Later in the paper we also use = to denote set
(Rule S2)
equality; its use should be clear from context.)
τ
4
The proof rule (modus ponens) says that if both
Abadi et al. “note that A and B can have the same
;
σ and the implication σ τ are valid (provable), beliefs without having the same possible worlds relation;
then τ is provable as well. It lets us prove the- however, because principals are identified by their relations in the semantics, we define equality in terms of relaorems about formulas that include the modal tions.” This is only possible if the model has two distinct
operators (says) by reasoning from premises to worlds in W that belong to all the same I sets; that is,
conclusions.
the model has two separate but indistinguishable worlds.
7

must be the same as the set of things B says. It
cannot be greater, by its semantic deﬁnition in
Section 3.1, and it cannot be less, or else there
is something B says that A does not.
From the deﬁnition we can derive:5

We have presented the logical tools for reasoning about formulas of statements. Recall that we
can also combine principals into principal formulas. For example, A ∧ B is the principal that
believes (says) only things that A and B agree
upon. In the logic, A ∧ B is deﬁned in terms of
its relationship to statements:

 (B ⇒ A)

;((B says σ)

;(A says σ))

(Theorem P8)
 (A ∧ B) says σ ≡ (A says s) ∧ (B says σ)
(Deﬁnition P1) When B ⇒ A, B is a stronger principal than A in
the sense that B can do everything A can do (by
Principal conjunction is associative, commu- making A believe the appropriate performative
tative, and idempotent:
statement), and perhaps more.
Using the associativity of ∧ for principals, it
 (A ∧ B) ∧ C = A ∧ (B ∧ C) (Axiom P4)
is clear that ⇒ is a transitive relation:
 A∧B = B∧A
(Axiom P4)
 (B ⇒ A) ∧ (C ⇒ B) ;C ⇒ A
 A∧A = A
(Axiom P4)
(Theorem L1)
Quoting (B|A) is deﬁned as:
(The ∧ in the theorem is that for statements. We
 (B|A) says σ ≡ B says (A says σ)
would like to use a diﬀerent symbol for clarity,
(Deﬁnition P2) but we stick with the notation of Abadi et al.
here.) Both the ∧ and | operators on principals
In a sense, the quoting operator “curries” a says
are monotonic with respect to ⇒:
operation from the propositional formula into
the principal formula, so that one can talk about
 (A ⇒ B) ;((A ∧ C) ⇒ (B ∧ C))
a principal quoting another without yet mentioning the speciﬁc statement being quoted.
(Axiom L2)
Quoting is associative and distributes over
;
 (A ⇒ B) ((A|C) ⇒ (B|C))
(Axiom L3)
conjunction in both arguments:
 (A ⇒ B) ;((C|A) ⇒ (C|B))
 (A|B)|C = A|(B|C)

(Axiom P5)

With the speaks-for relation, we can ﬁnally see
why quoting is a useful operation. One can let
(Axiom P6)
C|B ⇒ A, so that C can only speak for A when
it quotes B. Without quoting, we would need
a formal accounting for universal quantiﬁcation
4.2 The “speaks for” relation
over formulas: ∀σ, C says B says σ ;A says σ.
A central concept of the calculus is the “speaks
The semantics of ⇒ falls out fairly directly.
for” relation (⇒), which deﬁnes a partial order
Deﬁnition P7 requires that
over all principals. This relation encodes the notion of one principal trusting another that we inM, w |= B ⇒ A
troduced in Section 3.1.2. The statement B ⇒ A
iﬀ R(B) = R(B ∧ A) = R(B) ∪ R(A)
is read “B speaks for A,” and means that wheniﬀ R(A) ⊆ R(B)
ever B says something, A certainly agrees. Formally, we deﬁne
5
 A|(B ∧ C) = (A|B) ∧ (A|C)
 (A ∧ B)|C = (A|C) ∧ (B|C)

 (B ⇒ A) ≡ (B = B ∧ A)

Surprisingly, Abadi et al. drop Definition P7 and instead treat Theorem P8 as an axiom. Doing so precludes
theorems with conclusions containing ⇒, since we are
left with no axioms with ⇒ in the conclusion. In fact,
Theorem P8 requires only the weaker operator → in its
premise, which we discuss in Section ??.

(Deﬁnition P7)

Why is this the case? If A trusts B, then A says
everything B says. So the set of things B ∧A say
8

of ∧ and | operators, takes exponential time. To
make the decision problem tractable, Lampson
et al. deﬁne two high-level operators, as and
for , in terms of the lower-level operators. Each
operator is designed to reﬂect an idiomatic usage
pattern of the calculus. The higher-level operators can combine in fewer ways than the lowerlevel operators, allowing an implementation to
exploit characteristics such as associativity and
idempotence. In the abstract, the operators can
be treated as abbreviations and replaced by their
deﬁnitions, and they do not aﬀect the calculus.
We cover them here to demonstrate the idioms
they represent.

Notice that the condition on the R relations is
independent of the world w. So the extension
function E is all-or-nothing for speaks-for formulas:

W if R(A) ⊆ R(B)
E(B ⇒ A) =
∅ otherwise
(Deﬁnition A1)

4.3

Access Control Lists

The speaks-for relation, because it is transitive,
lets us reason broadly about how principals’ beliefs aﬀect one another. In the end, however, the
server wants to convince itself that some primitive proposition s, perhaps to be interpreted “it
is okay to change the contents of the ﬁle,” is true.
To support this, Abadi, Lampson et al. use the
construct A controls s to indicate that principal 4.5 Roles and the “ as ” operator
A’s beliefs about s are taken to be truth. It is
deﬁned as:
Abadi et al. deﬁne a distinguished, disjoint set
of principals called roles. By quoting a role,
A controls s ≡ ((A says s) ;s) (Deﬁnition A2)
a principal restricts its own authority. For exNow suppose B wants to write to the ﬁle that ample, deﬁne the roles Ruser and Radmin reps describes, and the assumptions  B ⇒ A and resenting a person acting as a user and as an
 A controls s hold. Then the ﬁle server will be administrator, respectively. Suppose the ACLs
able to verify a proof of  s, convincing itself that in the system include A|Radmin controls s1 and
A|Ruser controls s2 . In her daily work, Alice may
“it is okay to change the contents of the ﬁle.”
Lampson et al. encode access control lists step into her role as user by quoting Ruser; when
she needs to perform administrative tasks, Alice
(ACLs) using controls assumptions:
can explicitly quote Radmin to gain access to ob

jects such as s1 that mention her administrative
  A controls sread , 
 A controls swrite ,
ACL (O1 ) =
role. More interestingly, Alice can delegate just


 B controls sread
one of her roles to another principal by arranging that B ⇒ A|Ruser. Now Bob can do anything
By adjusting which principals’ assertions are be- Alice could do as a user, but he cannot access her
lieved, the ACLs allow or disallow agents to ef- administrative resources. Roles can also be used
fect action.
to sandbox untrusted code. When running untrusted software, Alice might delegate to it only
4.4 Higher-level operators
authority over A|Runtrusted, preventing the code
The operating system that instantiates the cal- from accessing the bulk of her resources.
culus requires resource servers to construct and
then verify all necessary proofs [WABL94]. Wobber calls it a pull model: it is the servers’
job to pull in necessary assumptions and proof
components needed to verify an agent’s access.
Building such proofs, when assumptions include
speaks-for formulas with arbitrary combinations

The as operator stands for quoting when
the quoted principal is a role (Axiom R1 in
[LABW92]). In a sense, as adds strong typing, requiring that its right-hand argument be a
role. In contrast to general principals, quoting
is idempotent and commutative for roles, and all
principals automatically speak for themselves in
9

appears in R(R1) ∩ R(R2), and ∩ is commutative. Finally, A ⇒ A as R1 is automatically true
R|R = R
∀R ∈ Roles (Axiom A3) when R is a role. Why? Composing R(R ) onto
1
1
∀R, R ∈ Roles (Axiom A4) R(A) cannot introduce any new worlds (since the
R |R = R|R
A ⇒ A as R
∀R ∈ Roles (Axiom R2) arrows of R(R1) are all reﬂexive), but may eliminate worlds (when R(R1)(w) = ∅). Hence
By virtue of these special features of roles and its
strong typing, the as operator takes on idempoR(A) ◦ R(R1) ⊆ R(A)
tence and commutativity. This helps make the
and we conclude A ⇒ A as R1 .
access control problem tractable.
every role:

4.5.1

4.6

Semantics for Roles

The axioms above are not supported for general
quoting, and yet as is simply an abbreviation
for quoting. Therefore, the axioms must be justiﬁed by some restriction on the possible-worlds
relations of the roles themselves. First we deﬁne
a special principal 1, the identity, who believes
everything that is true and nothing that is not:
R(1)(w) = w

∀w ∈ W

In any given world, 1 considers only that world
possible. Therefore, it only tells the truth (the
relation is reﬂexive), and it tells the whole truth
(no world has multiple arrows, so it is confused
about nothing). The identity serves as the most
trusted role a principal can assume. Why? Aas1
is shorthand for A|1, so R(A as 1) = R(A) ◦
R(1) = R(A): the identity role does not limit
A’s authority at all.
All roles are principals whose relations are constrained as follows:
R(R1) ⊆ R(1)

Delegation and the “for” operator

Besides encoding roles, quoting can be used to
encode delegations to trusted principals in a restricted way. Here is the problem: Imagine that
both Alice and Bob log in to machine M . Using
just the speaks-for operator, Alice might establish that M ⇒ A and Bob that M ⇒ B. But
then when Bob (sitting at his terminal to machine M ) tries to read a ﬁle that only A has
permission to read, M would say the request,
and the server would reason that A believed it.
In this situation, the access-control system cannot help the server reason about whether the ﬁle
should be read, since M has not provided enough
information.
Instead, A could require that M explicitly
mention A whenever it makes requests on A’s
behalf: M |A ⇒ A. Now when M is working for
B, it will be quoting B, not A, and A’s ﬁle is
safe. If M were corrupt, of course, it could still
abuse the authority granted it by A. But quoting principals helps an honest M pass the right
information to resource servers for access-control
decisions.
Lampson et al. deﬁne a slightly more complicated concept of delegation from A to B, written
as the compound principal B for A. The key
idea behind delegation is that both the delegator A and the delegate B must take some explicit
action for the delegation to take eﬀect:

This means that the role relation may contain
some edges w, w and not others, but no edges
that take one world to another world. A role,
when composed with another principal’s relation, cannot expand the set of worlds the principal considers possible, only reduce it. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
A says B|A ⇒ (B for A)
We are now prepared to justify the axioms for
B|A says B|A ⇒ (B for A)
roles. The ﬁrst property is idempotence. R(R1 )
takes each world to either itself or nowhere, so from which, using the deﬁnition of
composing R(R1 ) with itself should do the same. [LABW92, p. 295], we can conclude
The second property is commutativity. An ar(B|A) ⇒ (B for A)
row appears in R(R1 ) ◦ R(R2) exactly when it
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for

in

◦

An arbitrary principal
relation R(A) . . .

=

. . . composed with a
role relation R(R) . . .

. . . gives a new relation that is always a
subset of R(A).

Figure 2: Roles reduce relations they are composed with.

Then A installs B for A in ACLs for any resources it wishes to allow B to access on its behalf.
The diﬀerence between B simply taking care
to always quote A and B receiving a delegation
to B for A is subtle. In both cases, A must explicitly hand oﬀ authority to B. And in both
cases, B has to take some explicit action to accept the delegation; in the ﬁrst case, that action
is to quote A, in the second, it must also make a
separate statement accepting the delegation.
Like as, for seems to be introduced for its
special properties, to enable a more eﬃcient pullstyle theorem-proving implementation.
We have completed our review presentation of
the calculus due to Abadi, Lampson et al.

5

Review: The Simple Public
Key Infrastructure

The Simple Public Key Infrastructure 2.0 (SPKI,
pronounced “spooky”) is an Internet Experimental Protocol created by Ellison, Frantz, Lampson, Rivest, Thomas, and Ylonen [EFL+ 99]. As
its name suggests, it is designed to be a unifying standard for supporting public key authorization across the global Internet. We highlight
here some of the features of SPKI relevant to this
work.
First, SPKI’s primary goal is to provide a
server with evidence that the holder of a given
cryptographic key is ultimately authorized for a

request signed by that key. This goal contrasts
with that of other public-key infrastructure efforts that attempt to bind keys to identities, and
leave authorization to be handled in the conventional fashion by ACLs that map identity to authorization.
In this section, we review the types of certiﬁcates that SPKI supports, and outline the procedure used to determine whether a given certiﬁcate chain supports a requested operation.

5.1

Certificate types

SPKI deﬁnes its own certiﬁcate format, as well
as an internal representation of certiﬁcates to
which it can map other inputs, such as PGP
certiﬁcates, X.509 certiﬁcates, or locally maintained ACL entries. Authorization results can
be constructed from inputs providing information in one of three forms:
• authorization, key
• authorization, name
• name, key
The ﬁrst form coincides with SPKI’s design philosophy of mapping keys directly to
authorizations.
Inputs of the latter two
forms must ultimately be combined to form a
authorization, key mapping to become useful.
Inputs of the ﬁrst two forms are mapped into
a data structure called a 5-tuple for internal pro-
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cessing; inputs of the latter form are mapped into the certiﬁcate revocation list (CRL, a negative list of revoked certiﬁcates) and the timed
a data structure called a 4-tuple.
revalidation (a positive list of still-valid certiﬁcates), are performed by consulting a list re5.2 The SPKI 5-tuple
vised more frequently than the original certiﬁA 5-tuple has the following ﬁelds:
cate being checked. The one-time revalidation
• issuer: the public key granting the permis- check, which “represents a validity interval of
zero” [EFL+ 99, p. 21], is performed by contactsion deﬁned by the 5-tuple
ing the speciﬁed server to verify that the server
• subject: a public key or name to which the still approves the certiﬁcate.
permission is being granted
• delegation-control: a boolean value indicat- 5.3 The SPKI 4-tuple
ing whether this permission may be further Symbolic names are always interpreted relative
delegated
to a globally unambiguous name, usually a pub• authorization: a set of primitive permissions lic key. As a consequence, the deﬁnition of a
symbolic name is never ambiguous; it is always
being granted
the deﬁnition supplied by the key that grounds
• validity dates: a date range limiting the va- the name. The SPKI authors contrast this situlidity of this delegation
ation with that of PGP, where symbolic names
The intended meaning is that the issuer grants reside in a global namespace, and their meaning
the subject the permission described in the au- depends on the beholder and the “introducers”
thorization ﬁeld for the duration of the validity that the beholder trusts.
A symbolic name ultimately is deﬁned as one
dates. If the delegation-control bit is set, the
subject may further delegate any or all of the or more keys, although a single 4-tuple may deﬁne a name in terms of a chain of other names
permission to another subject.
The subject in a 5-tuple (or a 4-tuple, which grounded in a key. In that case, other 4-tuples
we present shortly) may be a k-of-n threshold must participate in the reduction of the name
function. In this case, the permission is dele- chain to a ﬁnal key. A 4-tuple has the following
gated to any principal that can prove it is autho- ﬁelds:
rized to speak for any k of the n “subordinate”
subjects listed in the threshold function.
The authorization ﬁelds contain primitive permissions whose interpretation is left to the application employing the SPKI authorization engine. These permissions are represented using
auth tags. Tags encode inﬁnitely large sets of
primitive statements in a form that permits a
compact representation of certain subsets. Notably, a tag can represent only a set of primitive
symbols; never a formula made from the negation or conjunction of primitive symbols. Tags
admit a simple intersection algorithm that always yields a compact representation of the intersected set.
SPKI certiﬁcates may also indicate an on-line
mechanism for verifying that the issuer considers a certiﬁcate still valid. Two of the checks,

• issuer: the public key deﬁning this name in
its private name space.
• name: the name being deﬁned
• subject: a public key or name to which the
name is bound.
• validity dates: a date range limiting the validity of this delegation
The intended meaning of a 4-tuple is that the
issuer deﬁnes the symbolic name, when grounded
by the issuer’s key, to be equal to the key identiﬁed by the subject for the duration of the validity dates. It is easy to read this deﬁnition
backwards. Note that a name deﬁnition tuple
does not give the issuer control over the subject, but the subject control over any permission
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Set

elsewhere granted to the grounded name “issuer:
name.” Hence a threshold subject is also meaningful as the subject of a 4-tuple; its use means
that if a principal speaks for k of the n subordinate subjects, that principal also speaks for “issuer: name,” and hence garners any permission
granted to that name.

5.4

Σ

Σ∗

Example
members
s, t

σ, τ
s∧t

Tuple reduction
∗

The SPKI access-control decision procedure is
called “tuple reduction.” Once the appropriate
certiﬁcates for an access-control decision have
been gathered, the on-line checks performed, and
the certiﬁcates converted into internal tuples, the
tuples are “reduced.” If the reduction results in
a 5-tuple issued by the server that grants the
requested permission to the key that signed the
request, then the request is authorized.
Reduction proceeds as follows. First, 4-tuples
are reduced to resolve names. 4-tuples that deﬁne a name in terms of another grounded chain
of names are reduced using 4-tuples that deﬁne
a name in terms of a key. Eventually, 4-tuples
of the former form are reduced to 4-tuples of the
latter form. The validity date stored in the outcome of each reduction is the intersection of the
validity dates of the 4-tuples being reduced.
Then the name, key bindings formed by the
reduced 4-tuples are applied to resolve names
in 5-tuples back to keys, again carrying validity
dates through with intersection operations. This
operation turns authorization, name 5-tuples
into authorization, key tuples.
At this point, each 5-tuple represents a subject key (or threshold subject deﬁned as a set of
keys) with authorization to perform some set of
actions on behalf of the issuer key. When two
5-tuples form a chain of delegation (the issuer of
the second is the subject of the ﬁrst, and the ﬁrst
tuple allows further delegation), the 5-tuples are
reduced to a new tuple whose subject is the subject of the second tuple and whose issuer is the
issuer of the ﬁrst. The reduced tuple carries the
intersection of the authorizations of the source
tuples as its authorization, and the intersection
of the validity dates of the source tuples as its
validity dates. Finally, the reduced tuple carries

Description
The set of primitive
propositions. They
represent resources.
The set of well-formed
formulas (statements)
constructed from Σ, ∧,
¬, A says, and B ⇒ A

2Σ

S, T, V

P

A, B

P∗

A, B
A∧B

The set of compound
principals constructed
from P , ∧, |, and ·N

N

N

The set of local names

The set of sets of
statements
The set of primitive
principals. They
represent agents,
including people,
machines, programs, and
communications
channels.

Figure 3: The symbols used to represent sets in
this paper.

the same delegation control bit as the second tuple did. Think of the delegation control bit as
the coupling on the back of a boxcar; if the ﬁrst
tuple lacks it, the cars cannot couple; if the second tuple lacks it, the cars may couple, but the
resulting “super-car” will also lack a rear coupling.
We return to SPKI in Section 9, where we apply our extended calculus to model SPKI.

6

The logic and semantics of
restricted delegation

Lampson et al. mention in passing the idea of
a qualiﬁed speaks-for operator [LABW92, p.
272]. In this section, we introduce our speaksfor-regarding operator, which formalizes the notion of the restricted speaks-for operator. It is
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T
written B ⇒ A, and read “B speaks for A re- restriction set is the intersection of the restriction
garding the set of statements in T .” T is any sets of each of the original delegations.
subset of Σ∗ . The desired meaning is that when
S
T
S∩T
 (C ⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ A) ;(C ⇒ A)
σ ∈ T,
(Theorem E6)
T

B⇒A

;((B says σ)


;(A says σ))


The power of the speaks-for-regarding operaT
tor ⇒ is that A can delegate a subset of its authority without modifying any ACLs. Contrast
the situation with the use of roles in Section 4.5,
where to delegate authority over a restricted subset of her resources, a user had to deﬁne a role
and install that role in the ACLs of each resource
to be shared.
Restricted speaks-for is transitive:

This is not to say that C may not speak for A
regarding more statements than those in the intersection; we address this topic further in Section 9.9.
If we have two restricted delegations from Alice to Bob, we might expect Alice to speak for
Bob with respect to the union of the restriction
T
sets. Because of the semantics we choose for ⇒,
however, this intuition does not hold.
S

;B S∪T
⇒

T

(B ⇒ A) ∧ (B ⇒ A) 

A

(Result E7)

In Section ??, we describe a relation weaker than
T
A) (Axiom E1) ⇒
for which the intuitive statement holds.
The quoting operator on principals (|) is
We expect the ∧ operation on principals to be
monotonic in both arguments over ⇒. Quoting
T
T
monotonic over ⇒:
is still monotonic over ⇒ in its left argument:
T

T

T
;
(C ⇒

 (C ⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ A)

T

 (B ⇒ A)

;
(B

T

∧ C) ⇒ (A ∧ C) (Axiom E2)

T

 B⇒A

T
;C|B ⇒


C|A

(Axiom E8)

Our semantics does not justify monotonicity
Restricted control over two principals is the
in the right argument, however:
same as restricted control over their conjunct:
T
T
T
(Result E9)
B ⇒ A  ;B|C ⇒ A|C
 (C ⇒ A) ∧ (C ⇒ B) ≡ C ⇒ (A ∧ B)
(Axiom E3) This result appears to limit the usefulness of
quoting. The same counterexample that shows
Let U be the universe of all well-formed formuResult E9 shows the same property for the weak
las; that is, those formulas over which a model
speaks-for relation deﬁned in Section ??, so it
M deﬁnes E. Restricted speaks-for degenerates
seems that the notion of quoting simply does not
to the original speaks-for when the restriction set
mix easily with restricted delegation.
is the set of all statements:
We can, however, propagate the quoted prinU
cipal through the restriction set. Let T ∗ be the
(Axiom E4)
 (B ⇒ A) ≡ (B ⇒ A)
closure of T with respect to the propositional opand ∧: T ⊆ T ∗ , and if σ, τ ∈ T ∗ , then
If Bob speaks for Alice regarding a set of state- erators ¬
∗
∗
ments T , he surely speaks for her regarding a ¬σ ∈ T and σ ∧ τ ∈ T . Furthermore let T C
be the closure of T with respect to the modal
subset T  ⊆ T :
operator C says: T ⊆ T C, and if σ ∈ T C, then

(C says σ) ∈ T C. Now (T ∗ )C is the modal clo∀T ⊆ T,
sure applied to the propositional closure of some
T
T
(Axiom E5) original set T. With these deﬁnitions, we can jus(B ⇒ A) ;(B ⇒ A)
tify this axiom:
Using Axiom E5, a chain of delegations can be
(T ∗ )C
T
; B|C ⇒
collapsed to a single delegation, connecting the
A|C (Axiom E10)
 B ⇒ A
head principal in the chain to the tail, whose
T
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When T = U, this axiom reduces to showing
right-monotonicity for the original speaks-for relation. This axiom means that A’s restricted delegation to B must explicitly include any “quotes”
of C that it is willing to believe B about. It seems
awkward, but it is a useful result. Why? Because in any possible-worlds semantics wherein
T
T
(B ⇒ A) ;(B|C ⇒ A|C) for all principals C,
the relation representing A depends on every
other principal relation. The introduction of malicious principals with cleverly-chosen relations
into such a system can eﬀectively expand T until T = U .

6.1

W →
Next we extend φT to the function φw
T :2
2W that maps a set of worlds Sw ⊆ W to a set of
equivalence class representatives in the projected
model:

φw
T (Sw ) = {w | ∃w ∈ Sw , w = φT (w)}
(Deﬁnition E13)
We use bar notation (w) to indicate an equivalence class representative (member of a world of
a projected model) as opposed to a member of
W in the original model.
We can now give our semantic deﬁnition of
restricted delegation:

T

Semantics of ⇒

T

E(B ⇒ A)


W
=

∅

We use a semantics based on possible worlds,
modeling a system with a model M =
W, w0, I, J whose components are deﬁned as
T

in [ABLP93]. The semantic deﬁnition of ⇒ is
based on the notion of “projecting” a model into
a space where only the statements in set T are
relevant. The idea behind this deﬁnition is that
if one were to take the “quotient” of a model M
with respect to the dual of T , the resulting model
M would be concerned only with statements in
T
T . B ⇒ A in M should be equivalent to B ⇒ A
in the original model. The model M is a projection of M that only preserves information about
statements in T .
We begin the construction by deﬁning an
equivalence relation ∼
=T : W × W that relates two
worlds whenever they agree on all statements in
T:

w∼
=T w  iﬀ ∀σ ∈ T, w ∈ E(σ) iﬀ w  ∈ E(σ)
(Deﬁnition E11)

φw
T (R(A)(w0)) ⊆
φw
T (R(B)(w0))
otherwise
(Deﬁnition E14)

if ∀w0

For the justiﬁcations of several of the axioms
it is more convenient to shift the projection (φ)
operation to one side of the subset relation. To
do so, we deﬁne



 

∼
φ+
T (R) = w0 , w1  ∃w1 =T w1 , w0 , w1  ∈ R
(Deﬁnition E15)
Think of φ+
T as a function that introduces as
many edges as it can to a relation without disturbing its projection under T .
We can use φ+
T to give an equivalent deﬁnition
T

of ⇒:


T

E(B ⇒ A) =

W
∅

if R(A) ⊆ φ+
T (R(B))
otherwise
(Deﬁnition E16)

Then we deﬁne the mapping φT : W → W The symbolic gymnastics of moving the projecthat takes worlds from the original model to
tion to the right side of the ⊆ relation is equivaequivalence classes under ∼
=T :
lent to the deﬁnition in terms of φw
T , but it makes


some
of
the
proofs
more
concise.
The
equivalence
∼T w (Deﬁnition E12)
φT (w) = φT (w ) iﬀ w =
is shown in Appendix A.2.
The equivalence classes belong to a set W = 2T ;
A casual intuition for this deﬁnition is that φT
notice that worlds (equivalence class representa- projects from the full model M down to a model
tives) in M cannot be confused with those in M . in which worlds are only distinguished if they
We give a construction of φT (w) in Appendix diﬀer with regard to the truth of statements in T .
Section A.1.
If we collapse away the accessibility arrows that
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do not say anything about what is happening in
T , and A’s relation is a subset of B’s relation
in the projection, then A knows everything B
knows about statements in T . This intuition is
exactly what we want for restricted delegation.
What happens if we take an alternative semantic deﬁnition for restricted delegation?

6.2

T

Additional benefits of ⇒
T

Introducing the ⇒ operator to the logic not only
provides the important feature of restricted delegation, but it simpliﬁes the logic by replacing
the controls operator, replacing roles, and providing a formal mechanism for the treatment of
expiration times.
6.2.1

With the speaks-for-regarding relation, A can
introduce a new role R2 for itself by allowing
T
(A as R2 ) ⇒2 A. In fact, roles are no longer necessary at all, but the as and for operator, or
operators like them, may still be useful for building tractable implementations.
Roles, as semantically deﬁned by Abadi et al.,
can also have surprising consequences because
they belong to a global “namespace.” Imagine
that both Alice and Bob use the role Ruser in
their ACLs. That means that the same relation
R(Ruser) encodes both the way that A as Ruser
is weaker than A, and the way that B as Ruser is
weaker than B.

6.2.3

Supplanting controls

Formalizing statement expiration

Now that we have the restricted speaks-for relation, we can dispense with the special controls
operator for building ACLs.
Recall Abadi et al.’s special identity principal 1 from Section 4.5.1. Because it believes
only truth, (1 says s) ;s for all statements s.
That is, there is an implicit principal that controls all statements. We can replace every statement of the form A controls s with an equivalent

Lampson et al. treat expiration times casually in
[LABW92, p. 270]: “Each premise has a lifetime,
and the lifetime of the conclusion, and therefore
of the credentials, is the lifetime of the shortestlived premise.” It is likely that a formal treatment of lifetimes would be time-consuming and
unsurprising, but the lifetimes are an unsightly
element glued onto an otherwise elegant logical
T
framework. Fortunately, the ⇒ relation allows
{s}
one: A ⇒ w0 1. This statement ensures that us to dispense with lifetimes.
if A says s, then at the actual world w0 of the
Recall from Section 4.3 that the primitive
model, 1 says s. Since the 1 relation only con- statements such as s are meant to encode some
tains edges from a node to itself, this condition operation in a real system. Assume that each s
can only be satisﬁed by selecting an actual world describes not only an operation, but the eﬀective
w0 where s is true.
time the operation is to take place.6 Further, asT

6.2.2

Supplanting roles

sume a restriction set T in a delegation B ⇒ A
includes restrictions on the times of the operations under consideration. After the last time allowed by the set, the delegation remains logically
valid, but becomes useless in practice. Furthermore, restrictions on T can be more than expiration times; one can encode arbitrary temporal
restrictions, such as only allowing a delegation
to be valid on Friday afternoons.

Roles as originally deﬁned are attractive, but
they have the signiﬁcant diﬃculty that introducing a new restricted role R2 involves ﬁnding all of
the objects that role should be allowed to touch,
and adding AasR2 to each of those ACLs. When
one of those objects does not allow ACL modiﬁcations by A, it is impossible for A to express
the desired new role. The SPKI document gives
6
a vivid example that shows how ACL manageLike Lampson et al., we ignore the issue of securely
+
ment can become unwieldy [EFL 99, p. 17].
providing loosely synchronized clocks.
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7

The semantics
names

of

SPKI

Recall from Section 6.2.2 how roles share a global
“namespace,” and the danger of crosstalk between applications of the same role. SPKI names
are promising, but they have the same property:
identical names have diﬀerent meaning depending on the “scope” in which they appear. To
model names, we need to extend our logic and
semantics.
We introduce to the logic a new set of primitive
names, N . We also extend principal expressions
to include those of the form P · N , where P is an
arbitrary principal expression and N ∈ N . P · N
is read “P ’s N .” Because · only accepts a principal as its left argument, there is no ambiguity
in the order of operations; P · N1 · N2 can only
be parenthesized (P · N1 ) · N2 .

7.1

The logic of names

What properties do we want names to have?
Local namespaces. First, a principal should
control the meaning of any names deﬁned relative to itself:
∀ principals A, names N :
T

(A says (B ⇒ A · N ))

T
;
(B ⇒

A · N)

We do not take this statement as an axiom for
the same reason that Abadi, Lampson et al. do
not accept the handoﬀ axiom [LABW92, p. 715],
[ABLP93, p. 273]. In particular, our semantics
does not support it. Instead, as with the handoﬀ
axiom, we allow the implementation to assume
appropriate instances of it.
Left-monotonicity. Second, name application should be monotonic over speaks-for. If Alice binds her name “barber” to Bob, and Bob
binds his name “butcher” to Charlie, then we
want “Alice’s barber’s butcher” to be bound to
Charlie.

capture the desired intuition:
(B ⇒ A · Nbarber) ;
B · Nbutcher ⇒ A · Nbarber · Nbutcher
Distributivity. We combine the following
pair of results
(A ∧ B) · N ⇒ (A · N ) ∧ (B · N )
(Theorem E18)
(A · N ) ∧ (B · N ) ⇒ (A ∧ B) · N (Axiom E19)
to show that names distribute over principal conjunction:
(A ∧ B) · N = (A · N ) ∧ (B · N )
(Theorem E20)
Here is a motivating example: If Alice has two
doctors Ed (E) and Fred (F ), and Bob visits
doctors Fred and George (G), then who is “(Alice
and Bob)’s doctor?” Fred is the only person who
serves as both people’s doctor.
No quoting axiom. The principal (A|B) · N
can be written, but we have yet to ﬁnd a meaningful intuitive interpretation for it. (A|B) · N
bears no obvious relation to (A · N )|(B · N ), for
example. We allow the principal in our logic, but
we have no axioms for extracting quoting from
inside a name application.
Nonidempotence. Finally, application of
names should not be always idempotent. Unless some other speaks-for statement causes it,
there is no reason that “Bob’s barber’s barber”
should speak for “Bob’s barber.” We were initially tempted to model name application (·)
with role application, because roles satisfy Axiom E17; however, roles are idempotent.

7.2

The semantics of names

We mentioned above that names and name application cannot be modeled with the roles and the
quoting operator, because quoting a role is always idempotent. Furthermore, using the same
(Axiom E17) role for multiple uses of the same name by diﬀer(B ⇒ A) ;(B · N ⇒ A · N )
ent principals introduces crosstalk as described
Using this rule, we can write the following to in Section 6.2.2.
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Instead, we model names as follows. First, we 7.3 Abadi’s semantics for linked local
add a new element K to the tuple that deﬁnes a
namespaces
model. A model with naming consists of:
Abadi gives an alternate logic and semantics
for SPKI-style linked local namespaces [Aba98].
M = W, w0, I, J, K
(He refers to SDSI, from which SPKI 2.0 derives.) Abadi’s notation diverges from that used
The new interpretation function K : P × N → in [ABLP93], but the semantics are the same.
2W ×W maps a primitive principal A and a name Figure 4 helps translate the notation. Our seN to a relation. The idea is that principals mantics diﬀers in three interesting ways.
First, SPKI has special global names, so that
only deﬁne the ﬁrst level of names in their
if
N
G is a global name, A · NG = NG . The renamespaces; all other names are consequences
sult is that the same syntactic construct can be
of chained ﬁrst-level name deﬁnitions.
Next we extend R to deﬁne the relations for used to bind a local name to another local name
principals formed through name application. We or to a globally-speciﬁed name. All names in
want to deﬁne R(A·N ) as the intersection of sev- linking statements are implicitly preﬁxed by the
eral other sets, each requirement ensuring a de- name of the speaking principal; but if the explicsired property. Our deﬁnition, however, would itly mentioned name is global, the preﬁx has no
end up circular (at requirement I, with equal consequence. We consider this syntactic sugar,
principals) if it were expressed in terms of set and leave it to an implementation to determine
intersection. Instead, we deﬁne R(A · N ) as the from explicit cues (such as a key speciﬁcation or
largest relation (subset of 2W ×W ) satisfying all a SDSI name that ends in !!) whether a mentioned principal should be interpreted as local to
of the following requirements:
the speaker.
Second, Abadi’s logic adopts the handoﬀ rule
R(A · N ) ⊆R(B · N )
(I) for names, which he calls the “Linking” axiom
(∀B : R(A) ⊆ R(B)) Here it is, translated to our terminology:
R(A · N ) ⊆K(A, N )
(II)
A says (B ⇒ (A · N )) ;(B ⇒ (A · N ))
(when A ∈ P )
R(A · N ) ⊆R(B · N ) ∪ R(C · N )
(III) He validates the axiom by the use of composition to model name application, with which we
(when A = B ∧ C)
disagree.
(Deﬁnition E21)
The third and most important way our semantics diﬀers from Abadi’s is that Abadi’s semanRequirement I supports Axiom E17. Require- tics models name application as quoting (compoment II applies only to primitive principals, and sition). Each unqualiﬁed (local) name is mapped
allows each primitive principal to introduce def- to a single relation. This property can introduce
initions for ﬁrst-level names in that principal’s crosstalk between otherwise unconnected princinamespace. A system implementing instances of pals; recall the example from Section 6.2.2. Even
the handoﬀ rule does so conceptually by modi- when a name relation is not constrained to be a
fying K(A, N ). Requirement III only applies to role, the same problem arises. For example, let
principal expressions that are conjunctions, and N represent the name “doctor.” Imagine that
justiﬁes Theorem E20.
Bob assigns Charlie to be his doctor: C ⇒ B|N .
There is no question some such largest rela- This is ﬁne; Charlie should be able to do some
tion exists. Since each requirement is a subset things on Bob’s behalf, but not everything: If
T
relation, at least the empty set satisﬁes all three. B|N ⇒ B, then Charlie can do the things in T .
Enter Alice, who is not only omniscient (A =
There is an upper bound, since every relation is
1), but serves as her own doctor (A ⇒ A|N ).
a subset of the ﬁnite set W × W .
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Abadi’s notation
S
µ : S × W → {true, false}
ρ : N × W → 2W
a∈W
principals p, q
n∈N
[[n]]a = ρ(n, a)
[[p s n]]a

Our notation
Σ
I : Σ → 2W
K : P × N → 2W ×W
w∈W
A, B ∈ P ∗
N ∈N
R(A · N )(w) = K(A, N )(w)
R(A · N )(w)

Figure 4: A guide to translating between Abadi’s notation and ours

Abadi’s semantics requires that R(1) ◦ R(N ) ⊆
R(1). At worst, R(N ) = R(1), causing B|N =
B, enabling Charlie’s doctor to make investment decisions on Charlie’s behalf. At best,
R(N ) ⊂ R(1), and B|N begins spouting oﬀ random statements, some of which may be in T ,
making Bob believe random statements.
Our semantics escapes this fate by assigning
to each use of a name its own relation, then
ensuring the correct subset relationships remain
among those relations. We must admit that our
semantics for names is at best opaque. Although
using an existential deﬁnition like “largest set
satisfying the requirements” is not illuminating,
we feel it is better than the alternative.

8

The semantics of authorization tag notation

An important part of SPKI is a user-deﬁned
<tag> object that describes either a speciﬁc request to be veriﬁed, or a set of permissions
granted in a delegation. SPKI deﬁnes how tags
are to be intersected, which gives the user some
idea about the meaning of tags. In this chapter,
we derive a formal language for tags and show
that tags are (almost) closed under intersection.
We also show that tags have a desirable property that we depend upon for our formalization
of SPKI’s properties in Section 9.9.

8.1

Overview

One confusing aspect of tags is that they serve
to represent both single requests and delegation
restrictions (sets of requests to be permitted).
How do they do this? The short answer is containment. Most tags represent an inﬁnite set of
ﬁnite strings. Let us call those strings powers.
A request to be veriﬁed is a set of powers; the
intuition is that executing the request requires
that the requester have at least a certain set of
privileges. A permission describes another set of
powers. If the permission’s set contains the request’s set, then the permission grants at least
each of the powers required for the request.
Why use inﬁnite sets of powers? For extensibility. In general, a permission (tag) is represented by an inﬁnite set of powers. Therefore,
it can always be further subdivided into morespeciﬁc permissions, each still represented by an
inﬁnite subset of the original permission’s powers.
Given this motivation for the structure of tags,
we construct tags from the ground up using
grammars. We begin by deﬁning bytestrings and
the atomic ﬁnite strings we have called powers.

8.2

Bytestrings and powers

Let Σ be the natural alphabet of our system; in
our case, let it be the set of 256 octets. Let B be
the set of all ﬁnite-length strings of octets, Σ∗ :
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B :=σB
|ε

(∀σ ∈ Σ)

Then we extend it recursively:

This is the set SPKI calls “bytestrings.” Next we
extend Σ with three metasymbols to unambiguously demarcate the list structure of a power:
Σ = Σ∪{( , , ) }. Now we deﬁne the mutuallyrecursive sets of expressions (E), lists of expressions (L), and non-empty lists of expressions
(N):

Aset (a1 ...ak )

ai
=

(Deﬁnition T5)

1≤i≤k

Alist (a1 ...ak )


x
x
.
.
.
x
·
·
·
x
)
(


1
2
k
n




such that
=
xi ∈ ai ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k






xi ∈ E ∀i, k < i
(Deﬁnition T6)

E :=B
|( L)
L :=N
|ε

Aj =

N :=E N
|E

Aj−1

A
set (a1 . . . ak ) ∀ai ∈ Aj−1

Alist (a1 . . . ak ) ∀ai ∈ Aj−1
(∀j > 0)

(Deﬁnition T7)
The gymnastics with the non-empty lists serve
to prevent lists from ending with a just before
Finally, the set A of auths is the union of all of
the ) ; this feels right but it is not important for
the Aj .
the development of the semantics.
Observe that every member a ∈ A is indeed a
We call the set of expressions E the set of pow- member of 2E. I show this inductively. Clearly
ers. Notice that every power is a ﬁnite object A
null and A∗ are members of the power set of E.
with an unambiguous tree structure deﬁned by By rule E := B, every singleton set A belongs
bs
the special delimiters { ( , , ) }. Every internal to the power set of E. This shows the base case,
node is a list, and every leaf node is a bytestring. A ∈ 2E .
0
An auth introduced at any set Aj is either an
Aset or an Alist. If it is an Aset , it is formed of
the union of other ai from Aj−1 . By the induc8.3 Auths
tion hypothesis, each ai is a subset of E, and
Recall that a tag, which speciﬁes either a request hence their union is as well. If the new auth is
or a set of delegated permissions, represents a instead deﬁned by Alist , it is composed of strings
(usually inﬁnite) set of powers. Our next task is ( x1 . . . xn ) . Each xi belongs to E, either
to deﬁne the set of auths, each a subset of E. In by its requirement to belong to a subset ai of E,
the next section, we show that the set of SPKI or by its requirement to belong to E itself. By
tags is, with some caveats, isomorphic to the set rule E := ( L ) , we know that E includes any
list formed of other members of E, which ensures
of auths we deﬁne here.
that every such string ( x1 . . . xn ) is indeed
We ﬁrst deﬁne the base-case auths:
in E.
Anull = ∅

(Deﬁnition T1)

A∗ = E

(Deﬁnition T2)

Abs (b) = {b}
A0 = Anull

8.4

(∀b ∈ B)



Closure of auths under intersection

The proof that A is closed under intersection is
constructive, and in fact leads directly to a conAbs (b) (Deﬁnition T4) crete implementation of tag intersection. Put
A∗
b∈B
another way, this proof provides direct intu

(Deﬁnition T3)
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ition why the SPKI tag intersection procedure
is meaningful.
Given any two members ax , ay ∈ A, we wish
to exhibit az = ax ∩ ay , with az ∈ A. We know
that there exist ix and iy such that ax ∈ Aix and
ay ∈ Aiy ; let us assume we have the smallest
such ix and iy . We will show by induction over
max(ix, iy ) that ax ∩ ay ∈ A; that is, there exists
some positive integer j such that ax ∩ ay ∈ Aj .
The base case of the induction has
max(ix, iy ) = 0; that is, ax ∈ A0 and ay ∈ A0 .
We show in cases I, II, and III that ax ∩ ay ∈ A0 ;
all possibilities for the base case appear in the
italicized upper-left-hand corner of Figure 5.
The induction hypothesis assumes for all
ix , iy < n, there exists a j  such that ax ∩ ay ∈
Aj  . Our task, given ax ∈ Aix and ay ∈ Aiy with
ix , iy ≤ n, is to exhibit j such that ax ∩ ay ∈ Aj .
We do so by constructing a set equal to the intersection using one of the ﬁve auth formulas Anull ,
A∗ , Abs (b), Aset , or Alist. Then we demonstrate
that the set given by the formula is in some Aj .
The choice of formula depends on how ax and
ay came to belong to Aix and Aiy . For example,
if ix (the smallest index for which ax ∈ Aix ) is
zero, then we know either ax = Anull , ax = A∗ ,
or ax = Abs (b) for some bytestring b. Otherwise,
if ix > 0, then ax = Alist (. . . ) or ax = Aset (. . . ).
The same options are possible for ay . To construct the intersection, we must consider all of
the pairwise possibilities. Figure 5 maps each
possibility to a proof case below. Notice we reuse
base cases I and II in the inductive step.
Case I. Either ax = Anull = ∅ or ay = Anull =
∅, so their intersection is empty, and can be represented by Anull . Anull = ∅ belongs to A0 .
Case II. Assume without loss of generality
(WOLOG) that ax = A∗ = E (if instead it is
ay = A∗ , the proof works symmetrically). Then
ax ∩ay = ay . Since ay ∈ Ai , we have ax ∩ay ∈ Ai .
Case III. Both ax and ay are singleton
bytestrings. If they contain the same bytestring
b, then their intersection is clearly ax ∩ ay =
Abs (b) = ax , which we know to be in Ai . Otherwise, the bytestrings are diﬀerent, the singleton
sets intersect to ∅, and we have ax ∩ ay = ∅ =
Anull ∈ A0 .
Case IV. Assume WOLOG that ax =

Alist(. . . ) and ay = Abs (b). Then every member of ax is a string beginning with the special
list delimiter ( , but the single member of ay
does not. Therefore their intersection is null, a
member of A0 .
Case V. Let ax = Alist (c1 . . . cj ), and ay =
Alist(d1 . . . dk ). Assume WOLOG j ≤ k. By Definition T6, the intersection ax ∩ ay =


( x1 x2 . . . xk · · · xn ) 







such
that






xi ∈ ci ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j
xi ∈ E ∀i, j < i










∈
d
∀i,
1
≤
i
≤
k
x
i
i




xi ∈ E ∀i, k < i
We can rewrite the conditions as:

( x1 x2 . . . xk · · · xn )




 such that
xi ∈ ci ∩ di ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j


∈ E ∩ di ∀i, j < i ≤ k
x


 i
xi ∈ E ∩ E ∀i, k < i













Since ax , ay ∈ Ai , we know by Deﬁnition T7 that
c1 . . . cj ∈ Ai−1 and d1 . . . dk ∈ Ai−1 . Let

ci ∩ di ∀i ≤ j
ei =
∀j < i ≤ k
di
The induction hypothesis gives us j  such that
ei ∈ Aj  . I can now write the intersection as
ax ∩ ay = Alist (e1 . . . ek )

( x1 x2 . . . xk · · · xn )



such that
=
xi ∈ ei ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k



xi ∈ E ∀i, k < i









Because ei ∈ Aj  , we conclude that ax ∩ ay ∈
Aj  +1 .
=
Case VI. Assume WOLOG ax
Aset (a1 . . . ak ). Let az = Aset (a1 ∩ ay , a2 ∩
ay , . . . ak ∩ ay ). We know ai ∈ Axi −1 for i ≤ k,
since ax ∈ Axi . By the induction hypothesis we know that there exist j1 . . . jk such that
am ∩ay ∈ Ajm for m ≤ k. Let j = maxm (jm)+1.
Because Aj−1 contains every Ai for i ≤ j − 1,
we have am ∩ ay ∈ Aj−1 for all m ≤ k. By our
construction of az , az ∈ Aj .
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ay
Anull
A∗
Abs (b)
Alist(. . . )
Aset (. . . )

Anull
I
I
I
I
I

A∗
I
II
II
II
II

ax
Abs (b) Alist(. . . )
I
I
II
II
III
IV
IV
V
VI
VI

Aset (. . . )
I
II
VI
VI
VI

Figure 5: Pairwise possibilities for set intersection. Roman numerals indicate the proof section that
handles the given case. The emphasized entries in the upper-left corner are the cases handled in
the base case of the inductive proof.

Having covered every possible combination of
ax and ay , we have shown the induction, and
hence that A is closed under intersection. Furthermore, the cases above direct our implementation of tag intersection: given any two tags,
we know which constructor (such as Alist) was
used to create it, since tags are represented as
such constructions. We can immediately apply
the techniques in the preceding cases to discover
a tag construct that represents the intersection
of the input tags.

8.5

Tags

can readily redeﬁne B, E and Alist to satisfy this
constraint. The basic structure of A does not
change; I depend only on each Aj ’s membership
in 2E.
8.5.3

The third caveat is that SPKI has special tags
range and prefix that deﬁne inﬁnite subsets of
the set of bytestrings. Our auth structure A can
be readily extended by prefix, but with range
present, A is no longer closed under intersection.
Consider for example the SPKI tags:

Tags in SPKI are approximately isomorphic with
auths. There are three caveats, related to null
tags, a special requirement on lists, and the special range and preﬁx tags.
8.5.1

The null tag

The ﬁrst caveat is that SPKI has no representation for the null tag (Anull ). The result is
that the SPKI documentation must tread clumsily around the issue by saying that two authorizations “fail to intersect,” rather than intersecting to a null set. By including the null set,
we promote “failure” to a ﬁrst-class object representable in the system.
8.5.2

Lists have an initial bytestring element

The second caveat is that lists in SPKI tags must
always have at least one element, and the ﬁrst element can only be a non-empty bytestring. One

Special tags cause havoc

(tag (* range numeric ge 0.5 le
0.5))
(tag (* prefix 000))
Their intersection is Arange (0.5, ≤, ≤, 0.5) ∩
Aprefix (000), which we know belongs to E. We
can see, however, that it does not belong to
A. The set contains an inﬁnite number of
bytestrings. We cannot construct it with an
Aprefix , or we would end up with numeric values other than 0.5; we cannot construct it with
an Arange or we would have preﬁxes other than
000. The only other way to introduce bytestrings
is Abs , which introduces only one at a time.
We may union together any ﬁnite number of
bytestrings with each application of Aset , but by
no Aj will we have constructed the inﬁnite set of
bytestrings necessary to describe the intersection
of the tags in the example.
Indeed, the trouble is concentrated in the
range form. The intersection of two ranges with
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diﬀerent ordering speciﬁcations can be an inﬁ- extend the base deﬁnition of A:
nite set of bytestrings not representable with the
Aprefix (p) = {b | b = ps, s ∈ Σ} (Deﬁnition T8)
range or prefix form.
Arange (f ) = {b | f (b) = true} (Deﬁnition T9)
How can we escape the dilemma? We can
Anull
A0 = 
omit the range special form, but that would not
A
∗

provide a satisfying model of SPKI. We could
A
bs (b)
b∈B
introduce an intersection operator analogous to
Aprefix (p)
p∈B
the union operator Aset , but that would be a
Abs (b)
b∈f
hack. Since A is otherwise closed under inter(Deﬁnition T10)
section, an intersection operator should never
be used except when intersecting these curious The function f : Σ∗ → {true, false} selects a
bytestring expressions, for it would only lead to range of bytestrings, and is used here as an abneedlessly larger representations for auths. Fi- breviation to hide that complexity. The function
nally, we may accept the incompleteness of tags. depends on the speciﬁed ordering (alpha, nuAssume t3 = t1 ∩ t2 , that is, the tag-intersection meric, time, binary, or date), the (optional) low
procedure run on tags t1 and t2 produces tag t3 . and high bounds, and bits specifying whether
Let A(t) be a function mapping a tag to the auth each bound is exclusive or inclusive.
it represents, a typically-inﬁnite subset of E. If
The matrix of intersection cases must now be
tags are complete, then A(t3 ) = A(t1 ) ∩ A(t2 ). extended to support the new possibilities (see
If we must sacriﬁce the completeness of tags, we Figure 6). This extension of course will no longer
still know that A(t3 ) ⊆ A(t1 ) ∩ A(t2 ). This pro- show the completeness of A under intersection
vides assurance that the authorization procedure (unless Arange is removed). But it is still useful
is at least still sound: we will not conclude a as a thorough guide to intersecting tags.
chained delegation confers powers that are not
Case VII. In this case, assume ax = Abs (b) =
conferred by both members of the chain.
{b} and ay = Aprefix (p) or ay = Arange (f ). This
case is very similar to case III: if b ∈ ay , then the
Treating the intersection of a range with a intersection is a = A (b) = a ; otherwise it is
z
bs
x
range or prefix as null should not be terribly ∅ = A .
null
limiting in practice. When either form is used, it
Case VIII. We have ax = Aprefix (px) and
is specifying a value for some ﬁeld with a particu- a = A
y
prefix (py ). Assume WOLOG |px | > |py |
lar interpretation; it is likely that in a real system (p is a longer string). If p is a preﬁx of p
x
y
x
any given ﬁeld would only have one meaningful (that is, p = p s), then a ∩ a = a : if b ∈ a ,
x
y
x
y
x
x
mode of comparison.
b = px s = py ss , so b ∈ ay . Otherwise, when py
is not a preﬁx of px, the intersection is empty:
b ∈ ay implies b = py s, and we know py disagrees
at some symbol position with px, so b ∈ ax .
Case IX. Set ax is a range and set ay is a
range or a preﬁx. Often we will treat the intersection as null (to preserve the soundness of
8.5.4 Semantics of special tags
auths). In a speciﬁc circumstance, when both ax
and ay are ranges speciﬁed with the same ordering function, we can readily construct a range
SPKI contains several special forms for tags: (*) equal to the intersection by taking the more rerepresents the auth A∗ . (* set ...) repre- strictive of the bounds from each input range.
sents the auth Aset (...). (* prefix ...) and
Case X. Assume WOLOG ax is a list and ay
(* range ...) represent (possibly inﬁnite) sets is a range or preﬁx. In this case, every string in
of bytestrings. To model these tags, we need to ax begins with the list delimiter ( , and every
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ay
Anull
A∗
Abs (b)
Aprefix
Arange
Alist(. . . )
Aset (. . . )

Anull
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

A∗
I
II
II
II
II
II
II

ax
Abs (b) Aprefix
I
I
II
II
III
VII
VII
VIII
VII
IX
IV
X
VI
VI

Arange
I
II
VII
IX
IX
X
VI

Alist (. . . )
I
II
IV
X
X
V
VI

Aset (. . . )
I
II
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI

Figure 6: Pairwise possibilities for set intersection in the presence of the range and prefix auth
constructors. The emphasized entries are additions beyond Figure 5.

string in ay begins with a symbol in the octet
alphabet (Σ), so the intersection is null.
Notice that only case IX spoils the completeness property; striking Arange from our deﬁnition
removes its row and column from the matrix,
eliminating any reference to case IX.

8.6

The meaning of intersection

The SPKI documentation describes the intersection of two authorization tags as having two possible outcomes: a new tag or a failure to intersect. These results are meant to be interpreted
diﬀerently depending on whether the intersection
operation was between two delegations, or between a delegation and a speciﬁc request.
In the former case, the desire is that the tag
that is the product of the intersection represents
no more power than either argument tag delegated by itself, and that if the intersection fails,
then the combination of the delegations is worthless.
In the latter case, the desired interpretation is
that should the intersection succeed at all, the request must be authorized by the delegation tag.
This interpretation makes sense if every request
is more speciﬁc than any delegated permission;
the only intersection possible is to return the request tag.
Our semantics lends a very concrete interpretation in both cases. When intersecting delegated permissions, it returns exactly the subset of powers granted by both input tags (modulo the incompleteness introduced by the range

form, in which case it returns a subset of the
intersection of the powers). If the tags have a
null intersection, we treat that object just like
any other; however, because it is an empty set
of powers, it is “worthless” in the sense that no
request will be authorized by it.
When authorizing requests, we intersect the
delegation tag with the request tag, and test
whether the result equals the request tag. If so,
we can conclude that all of the (typically inﬁnite) set of powers demanded by the request
are granted by the delegation. If not, we conclude that some smaller (possibly empty) set of
powers were granted; in any case, they are not
suﬃcient to justify granting the request. With
our semantics, it is not necessary for all requests
to be ﬁner grained than all delegated permissions. This property ensures that user-deﬁned
tag structures can be readily extended without
confusing the meaning of the request authorization test.
Set containment provides a concrete, mathematically sound interpretation for specifying authorizations in an inﬁnitely-extensible fashion.

8.7

Order dependence

The semantics of SPKI tags speciﬁcally depend
on the order of elements in a list; intersection
of two lists involves pairwise intersection of each
list’s elements. Because lists are implicitly followed by an arbitrarily-long supply of A∗ s, lists
are extensible in that a new property can be deﬁned for the list and assigned to the next unused
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new extension such as anniversary, we could
simply assign it to the index of the employee
list given by the ordinal value of the bytestring
“anniversary.” This approach, however, is not
desirable with the current deﬁnition of tag representations. A tag using the anniversary exten(employee
sion, for example, would contain some 1.2 × 1026
(id (*))
instances of (*) to place the (anniversary
(salary (*))
...) sublist in the correct location.
)
To make the solution work, we propose a simSuch a deﬁnition gives users of the system the ple extension to SPKI’s special-form tags, the
ability to delegate to others rights such as the named-attribute (named) form:
right to inspect only employee records with
(* named (attribute-name ...))
a speciﬁc ID number (employee (id 01247)
(*)), or those of employees earning more An named-attribute tag expression always has a
than $50,000 (employee (*) (salary (range single list argument. The ﬁrst element of the list
gt 50000))). Because tags are extensible, one is a bytestring (a requirement in SPKI), which
may later decide that the ability to select em- we call the attribute-name, and the remainder of
ployees based on anniversary year is useful, so the list is the associated value. Let ord(b) be
the deﬁnition is extended to:
the ordinal value of a bytestring b. A list conposition in the list.
For example, imagine that one is deﬁning a
tag format for delegating access to a database of
employee records. A ﬁrst-cut tag format might
look like:

taining a (* named (attribute ...)) special
form would represent the list in which the argument of the special form appears at position
ord(attribute) in the list.

(employee
(id (*))
(salary (*))
(anniversary (*))
)
Because list tags are followed by implicit (*)
members, all existing delegation tags continue
to be meaningful even when the new format is
deployed.
What happens, however, if two independent
organizations want to extend the format independently? In our example, perhaps one department of the corporation wishes to add the anniversary extension (and does so for their internal applications), and another department adds
an extension representing hair color to the tag
format used in their applications. The resulting extensions do not necessarily compromise security (since each sublist is annotated with the
name of the attribute it refers to), but the extensions may never be used together: that third
spot in the employee list can only contain one
sublist.
There is an attractive solution. The semantic deﬁnition of auths does not preclude assigning elements to locations in lists with arbitrarily high indices. Therefore, when assigning a

8.7.1

Handling non-bytestring attribute
names

Our general semantics does not require lists to
begin with a bytestring. We can easily deﬁne an
ordering over Σ rather than just Σ, and compute the location of the attribute in the parent
list based on the ordinal value of the attribute
name, even when that “name” is itself a list.
This ﬁx does not handle lists containing sets.
The use of sets as attribute names would require some canonical ordering of the members
in the set. Their use would also require a unique
representation for any auth containing a set. It
turns out that such a representation is indeed
possible, formed by bubbling every set operator
out of the inside of lists and joining them. This
canonical form makes small tags into large ones;
for example, (a (* set b c d) e) becomes (*
set (a b e) (a c e) (a d e)). Fortunately,
the ord() function is only a theoretical construct
used in the semantics; it would never be needed
in any implementation of auth intersection.
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8.7.2

Interference between ordered and 8.7.4
named attributes

With the deﬁnition given above, one might cause
an unexpected interaction between named attributes and attributes speciﬁed by their order
when their positions in the list coincide. For
example, if ord(A) = 65, one might construct
a list with sixty-ﬁve attributes speciﬁed in order, as well as a named attribute (* named (A
cat)). The named attribute and the sixty-ﬁfth
ordered attribute would coincide, and so far we
have given no speciﬁcation for how to map a list
tag to an Alist when the tag speciﬁes multiple
auths for the same position in the list.
The semantic solution is simple: let the nth ordered attribute appear at location 2n − 1 in the
list, and let each named attributed appear at location 2 · ord(attribute-name) in the list. There
are an inﬁnite supply of odd and even list locations, and they do not interfere with one another.
What should an implementation do with a tag
that speciﬁes the same named attribute twice? It
seems natural that the list location should contain the intersection of the associated values.

8.7.3

Intersection of lists
named attributes

containing

In any real implementation, of course, we cannot
expand a list containing named attributes into its
semantic form, since the length of the list grows
exponentially with the length of the names of the
attributes. We expect the lists to be sparse, so
a sparse representation of the lists should work
well. Store explicit position indices (attributenames where deﬁned, and the list index otherwise) alongside the corresponding values, with
the entire collection sorted by position. The intersection routine walks the lists simultaneously
and invokes itself recursively whenever it encounters two values with the same attribute-name or
position index. As in the basic list intersection
routine, if only one list speciﬁes a value for a
given position, the other list’s value is assumed
to be A∗ , and the intersection is the explicitly
speciﬁed value.

Recommendations for the use of ordered and named attributes

In the SPKI RFC, the authors suggest that while
lists can be used to name attributes, one can
omit the names for compactness. In their example,
(ftp (host ftp.clark.net) (dir
/pub/cme))
becomes:
(ftp ftp.clark.net /pub/cme)
The rationale is that attributes are positiondependent, so there is no ambiguity when the
attribute names (host and dir) are dropped.
Indeed, any correct mechanical implementations can infer the meaning of the values by their
position in the list. It is likely, however, that a
human implementor may incorrectly infer the intent of the values, perhaps because he only has
access to example attribute values but not the
names.
We recommend that attributes be supplied
with names whenever possible. Whether attribute positions are speciﬁed by order or by a
named-attribute special form is immaterial; that
decision is one of expediency, and can be made
based on the likelihood that a given attribute will
be omitted from a tag speciﬁcation. Providing
names that document the meanings of values,
however, helps avoid ambiguity, especially in a
structure that is intended to be extensible in the
future and by unknown parties. Our recommendation is an example of principle 1 from [AN96]:
“Every message should say what it means.”

8.8

Analogy with Dedekind cuts

This perspective on SPKI auth tags has a pleasant analogy to Dedekind’s construction of the
real numbers [BM91, pp. 15–17]. Each real number α is deﬁned by an inﬁnite set of rational numbers less than α; the result is continuity. The rationals are totally ordered. Every Dedekind cut
respects that ordering by containing every rational less than any rational that appears in the
cut.
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In the construction of auths as sets of powers presented here, powers can be partially ordered, and auths respect that ordering by containing every power less than any power that appears in the auth. The result is a kind of density corresponding to the continuity of the reals.
Any two unequal reals have another real between
them; by analogy, any list auth can be arbitrarily
subdivided into smaller auths along an arbitrary
number of dimensions. This limitless extensibility makes SPKI auth tags adaptable to changing
environments.

9

Modeling SPKI

The original Calculus for Access Control is useful because its principals are general enough to
model several parts of a computing system, from
users to trusted servers to communications channels. To formally model SPKI with our extended
calculus, we ﬁrst give a construction that models
the delegation-control bit.

9.1

Delegation control

The SPKI document gives the motivation for
including a delegation-control bit in SPKI certiﬁcates. We disagree with the argument and
fall in favor of no delegation control, and for
the same reasons as described in the document:
delegation control is futile, and its use tempts
users to divulge their keys or install signing oracles to subvert the restriction. Such subversion
not only nulliﬁes delegation control, but forfeits
the beneﬁts of auditability provided by requiring
proofs of authorization. In spite of our opinion,
we present a construction that models delegation
control.
To model the delegation-control feature we
wish to split the says modality into two separate
modalities: “utterance,” which represents a principal actually making a statement, and is never
automatically inherited by other principals, and
“belief,” which is inherited transitively just as
says is. Not only is introducing a new logical
modality clumsy, but it would require us to support a dubious axiom, undermining the simplicity of the semantics.

Instead, we resort to an equivalent construct:
we split each “real” principal A we wish to model
into subprincipals Au and Ab . Au shall say
only the things that A utters (statements that
are actually signed by A’s key; recall that all
certiﬁcate-issuing principals in SPKI are keys),
and Ab shall say all of the things that A believes. A may inherit her beliefs from other principals (because she has delegated to other subjects the authority to speak on her behalf), and
furthermore A should believe anything she utters. This last condition replaces the clumsy axiom we wished to avoid; instead we enforce it by
explicitly assuming the following statement for
all principals A and statements s:
 Au says s

;A says s
b

(Assumption E22)

Certiﬁcates issued by A are statements uttered
by A asserting things that A believes, so we
model them as statements about Ab said by Au .
The desirable outcome is that no principal can
delegate authority to make herself utter something (make Au say something); she may only
utter the statement directly (by signing it with
her key).

9.2

Restriction

Recall that a SPKI 5-tuple includes ﬁve ﬁelds:
issuer, subject, delegation-control bit, authorization, and validity dates. Let I and S represent
the issuer and subject principals. Let TA represent the set of primitive permissions represented
by the authorization S-expression, and TV the
set of primitive permissions limited by the validity dates (assuming the eﬀective-time encoding
of Section 6.2.3). The 5-tuple can be represented
this way if its delegation-control bit is set:
Iu says Sb

TA∩TV

⇒

Ib

or this way if not:
Iu says Su

TA ∩TV

⇒

Ib

A 4-tuple has a name ﬁeld (N ) and no authorization ﬁeld or delegation-control bit. It would
be encoded:
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T

V
Ib · N
Iu says Sb ⇒

It seems natural that a delegation bit is meaningless for a name binding, for in SPKI, a name
principal can never utter a statement directly,
only a key principal can. It surprised us, however, that SPKI name-binding certiﬁcates omit
the authorization ﬁeld. Why not allow a principal to say the following?
Iu says (S2b

{shampoo}

⇒

Ib · Nbarber)

would obviously want to work with them in their
unexpanded form.

9.5

Auth tags

The “auth tags” used in authorization ﬁelds
in SPKI represent sets of primitive statements.
Therefore, we simply model them using mathematical sets.

As it turns out, our semantics does not support
such restricted name bindings (see Section ??).

9.6
9.3

Linked local namespaces

The subject principals in the keys above may be
either keys (each directly represented by a primitive principal) or a string of names grounded
in a key. Hence namespaces are “local” in that
names are meaningless except relative to a globally unambiguous key; namespaces are “linked”
in that the naming operation may be repeated:
If K1 · N1 resolves to K2 , then K1 · N1 · N2 is the
same as K2 · N2 , perhaps deﬁned as some K3 .
We gave a logic and semantics for linked local
namespaces in Section 7. We model the SPKI
name subject “george: (name fred sam)” with
the principal expression Kgeorge · N“fred” · N“sam” .
Substituting the principal expression for Sb , a
4-tuple takes on the general appearance:

Tuple reduction

The SPKI access-control decision procedure is
called “tuple reduction.” A request is granted if
it can be shown that a collection of certiﬁcates
reduce to authorize the request. The reduced
tuple’s subject must be the key that signed the
request; the tuple’s issuer must represent the
server providing the requested service; and the
speciﬁc request must belong to the authorization
tag of the reduced tuple.
It is clear that tuple reduction is sound with
respect to our extended logic. When 5- and
4-tuples are encoded in the logic as shown in
Sections 7 and 9.2, tuple-reduction simply constructs a proof from several applications of Theorem E6 and Axiom E17.

T

V
Ib · N0 )
Iu says ((KS · N1 · · · Nk ) ⇒

9.4

9.7

Threshold subjects

A threshold subject is a group of n principals
who are authorized by a certiﬁcate only when k
of the principals agree to the requested action.
Such certiﬁcates are really just an abbreviation
for a combinatorially-long (nk ) list of conjunction
statements. For example, a certiﬁcate with a 2of-3 threshold subject naming principals P1 , P2 ,
and P3 and an issuer A can be represented as:

Validity conditions

An optional validity condition, such as a certiﬁcate revocation list, a timed revalidation list, or a
one-time validation, can be encoded in the logic
using a conjunction. For example, a certiﬁcate
requiring a timed revalidation would be interpreted
A says (B ∧ (R|H1)) ⇒ A

P2 ∧ P3 ⇒ A

to mean that principal R must verify that this
certiﬁcate (with hash H1 ) is valid. Principal R
signs a revalidation instrument I with a short
validity interval TV

Hence the logic easily captures threshold subjects, although any tractable implementation

V
R says I ⇒
R

P1 ∧ P2 ⇒ A
P1 ∧ P3 ⇒ A
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T

and a given revalidation instrument would agree or communications channel diﬀerentiate when it
is working on behalf of one client versus anwith all valid outstanding certiﬁcates:
other [LABW92, Sections 4.3, 6.1, 6.2, and 7.1].
I says 0 ⇒ I|H1
Without quoting, such a server has permission
I says 0 ⇒ I|H2
to make statements for either client, so it must
..
perform an access-control check in advance of re.
laying a client’s statement. Quoting lets the mulThe principal 0 has relation R(0) = ∅, so that tiplexed server defer the complete access-control
every principal speaks for 0. Using the logic, we decision to the ﬁnal resource server that veriﬁes
the proof. The result is a smaller trusted comcan reason that
puting base and improved auditability.
TV
R|H1
0 ⇒ I|H1 ⇒
T

V
and since B = B ∧ 0, B ⇒
A. Notice the treatment of a certiﬁcate’s hash as a principal. In the
logic, principals are general entities and can be
used to represent many objects and actors.
Negative certiﬁcate revocation lists can be
handled similarly; an implementation examining
a revocation list would conclude I says 0 ⇒ I|H1
for any H1 not present in the list.
One-time revalidations are meant to be interpreted as having a zero validity interval. A system verifying a request s creates a nonce E, understanding E says s, and sends it to the revalidator R. R replies with a statement meant to
be interpreted

{s}

R says E ⇒ R|H1

9.9

Dangerous extensions

In this section, we argue that SPKI auth tags
should not be extended to represent logical negations. If B speaks for A regarding multiple restriction sets, the semantics suggest that B actually has some authority not explicitly mentioned
in either set. For example,
{σ,τ }

(B → A)

{s}

{σ}

(B ⇒ A)

Safe extensions

Our semantics suggests that SPKI may be safely
extended to support a variety of principals other
than public keys. Channels protected by secret keys or a trusted computing base, for example, are easily modeled as principals in the
logic. Conjunct principals (A ∧ B) are not ﬁrstclass entities in SPKI, although they can appear
as threshold subjects; an extended SPKI might
exploit Theorem E20.
Quoting principals are also missing from
SPKI; Lampson et al. give nice examples showing how quoting can help a multiplexed server

A)

(Axiom E23)

means that a principal believed on a set of statements is also believed on their conjuncts. This
conclusion seems fairly natural, but it is interesting to note that a restriction set actually permits
more statements than it represents explicitly.
With our projected version of Abadi’s speaksfor semantics, not only does

{σ,τ }
Now both B1 and E ⇒ R|H1 say s, so A says s.
(B ⇒ A)
Any future request of the same sort will require
another revalidation, for its s will have a diﬀerent hold, but also:
eﬀective time.

9.8

}
;(B {σ∧τ
→


}
;(B {σ∧τ
⇒


;(B {¬σ}
⇒

A)

A)

(Axiom E24)

(Axiom E25)

This result implies that given authority on a set
of primitive statements, a principal also has authority on any propositional formula constructed
from those statements. It is surprising, for even
{s}

if only B ⇒ A is explicitly granted, B can also
cause A to say the negation of s.
Perhaps scarier still is that
{σ}

B ⇒ A

;B {σ,¬σ}
⇒

A

;(B says false)

;(A says false)

The conclusion is the deﬁnition of Abadi’s %→
relation:
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“Intuitively, A %→ B means that there
is something that A can do (say false)
that yields an arbitrarily strong statement by B (in fact, false). Thus, A %→
B means that A is at least as powerful
as B in practice.” [ABLP93, p. 713]

port restricted delegation, delegation control,
and local namespaces. To deﬁne the semantics
of restricted delegation, we project a model to
a set of worlds distinguished only by statements
in the restriction set. The resulting system provides intuition and a formal framework in which
we reason about the current SPKI system and
With these semantics, one might fear that possible extensions to SPKI.
no restriction is actually meaningful.
How
One of the advantages our formal framework
might we escape it?
One option is to
is
that it represents the many complicated feaabandon the K axiom (A believes s ∧
tures
of SPKI with three simple concepts: prinso that
A believes (s ;t) ;A believes t),
principals no longer believe every consequence cipal, statement, and name. Features such as
of their beliefs. This option is undesirable threshold subjects and on-line validations can
because it cripples the logic to only operate be modeled with compound principals and idiomatic statements. The simplicity also suggests
outside the scope of belief operators.
A second option is to both disallow negative that SPKI may be safely integrated with systems
statements in restriction sets and to use the with notions of “principal” other than SPKI’s
T
T
weaker B → A relation instead of B ⇒ A to public keys; such principals are desirable because
they can exploit fast local or secret-key-protected
model delegation.
A third option is to prevent principals from channels. We are applying our results in just this
making contradictory statements. This is dif- way in a prototype system currently under implementation.
ﬁcult in general in a distributed system. One
Our formalism also warns of the danger of
approach is to prevent principals from making
apparently-harmless
extensions. In our semannegative statements at all. SPKI takes this approach. Its tags, which represent both restriction tics, allowing a principal to utter both a statesets and individual statements, cannot represent ment and its negation or allowing restricted deleboth a statement and its logical negation. We gation to a name binding would reduce restricted
provide a formal treatment of tags in Section 8. delegation to meaninglessness. It would be imAnother extension might be to allow SPKI prudent to so extend SPKI without developing
name bindings (4-tuples) to include authoriza- an alternate semantics that gives the extension
tion restrictions. As mentioned in Section ??, meaning. One might also assume that delegathe semantics does not support this seemingly- tion over two sets of permissions should combine
to represent a delegation over the union of the
natural extension.
We conclude that in certain dimensions, SPKI permissions, but Result E7 suggests that this is
is as strong as it can be. Changing SPKI by not the case.
allowing principals to make negative statements
or by allowing negative statements in restriction
sets would push SPKI “over the edge,” making
its restrictions meaningless. Those proposing to Acknowledgements
augment SPKI or other systems based on a logic
such as that presented here must be wary of this Thanks to John Lamping, who patiently helped
hazard.
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Proofs

Necessity. Given φT (w) = w = φT (w  ), we know
∀σ ∈ T, σ ∈ w iﬀ w ∈ E(σ), and likewise, ∀σ ∈
T, σ ∈ w iﬀ w  ∈ E(σ). Therefore ∀s ∈ T, w ∈
E(σ) iﬀ w  ∈ E(σ), and we conclude w ∼
=T w  .
Suﬃciency. From the deﬁnition of w ∼
=T w  , we

know ∀σ ∈ T, w ∈ E(σ) iﬀ w ∈ E(σ). Let w = {σ ∈
T |w ∈ E(σ)} and w  = {σ ∈ T |w  ∈ E(σ)}. From our
hypothesis we know that the conditions on w and w
are the same, so φT (w) = w = w = φT (w  ).
In the following proofs, we generally use a bar (w)
to indicate a member of an equivalence class constructed as shown here.

A.2

+
Equivalence of φR
T and φT definiT
tions of ⇒

We now justify our claim in Section 6.1 that Deﬁnition E14 and Deﬁnition E16 are equivalent.
T

Necessity. Assume B ⇒ A holds according to
Deﬁnition E14:

w

∀w0 (φw
T (R(A)(w0 )) ⊆ φT (R(B)(w0 )))
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For all w0 , w1,

B

w0 , w1  ∈ R(A) ;w1 ∈ R(A)(w0 )
; w ∈ φw (R(A)(w )),
 1
0
T
w 1 = φT (w1 )
;w
 1

;


∈ φw
T (R(B)(w0 ))

(using the assumption)
∼
=T w1 ,
w0 , w1  ∈ R(B)(w0 )
∈ φ+
T (R(B))

T

Suﬃciency. Assume B ⇒ A holds according to
Deﬁnition E16:
R(A) ⊆ φ+
T (R(B))
φw
T (R(A)(w0 )),

we know that
Given w0 and w 1 ∈
there is some w1 ∈ R(A)(w0 ), with w 1 = φT (w1 ). We
rewrite the statement w0 , w1  ∈ R(A), and invoke
the assumption to get w0 , w1  ∈ φ+
T (R(B)). Now we
know there exists w0 , w1  ∈ R(B) with w1 ∼
=T w1 .
Changing notation again, w1 ∈ R(B)(w0 ). Since
w1 ∼
=T w1 , we know w 1 = φT (w1 ), and we may conclude w 1 ∈ φw
T (R(B)(w0 )).
Together, the two implications show the equivalence.

An undesirable semantics for ⇒

A.4

Proof of soundness

s
t

s
t

T

Figure 7: In this example, T = {s}. Notice that
T
B → A.

for Axiom S1, Rule S2, Axiom S3, and Rule S4 apply.
T
Our extensions deﬁne E for a new formula (B ⇒ A)
and R for a new principal (A· N ), but do not perturb
Abadi’s original semantics for the calculus for access
control. Because those semantics do not depend on
any particular structure in E or R, the axioms of the
calculus remain sound in our extended calculus.
Our present task is to show that the axioms of our
extensions are sound.
Axiom E1. This axiom follows easily from Deﬁnition E14. For all w0 ,
w
φw
T (R(A)(w0 )) ⊆ φT (R(B)(w0 ))

T

A.3

s
t

B

∃w1

;
w0 , w1 

A
s
t

2
⊆ φw
T (R(C)(w0 ))
Notice that φ+
projects
only
the
destination
world
T
of each edge in a relation. Why do we not project
The following lemma shows that φ+
T preserves the
both ends of the relation? Such a deﬁnition actu- union operation. Let R and R be relations.
1
2
ally does not preserve our most basic intuition, that
T
T
B ⇒ A ;B → A. In the model in Figure 7, the dotw0 , w1  ∈ φ+
T (R1 ∪ R2 )
ted ovals depict the equivalence classes under T ; pro ∼
≡ ∃ w1 =T w1 , w0 , w1  ∈ R1 ∪ R2
jecting both ends of the edges in R(A) gives {T, ∅},
≡ ∃ w1 ∼
=T w1 ,
as does R(B). From world w0 , however, B says s but
w0 , w1  ∈ R1 ∨ w0 , w1  ∈ R2
not A says s.
Given a relation w0 , w1, then, the reason we only
≡
∃ w1 ∼
=T w1 , w0 , w1  ∈ R1

∼T w1 , w0 , w   ∈ R2
project w1 is this: w0 is aﬀected by what statements
∨ ∃ w1 =
1
are true at w1 ; substituting other worlds equivalent
+
≡w0 , w1  ∈ φ+
(R
)
∨
w
1
0 , w1  ∈ φT (R2 )
T
with respect to T does no harm. Substituting other
+
≡w0 , w1  ∈ φ+
worlds for w0 , on the other hand, changes what stateT (R1 ) ∪ φT (R2 )
ments we consider true at w0 .
From this equivalence we conclude
+
+
φ+
T (R1 ∪ R2 ) = φT (R1 ) ∪ φT (R2 )

(Lemma E27)

In this section, we show that our extension to LampAxiom E2. We assume the premise in terms of
son’s calculus is still a sound axiomatization of the
Deﬁnition
E14:
presented semantics. Like Lampson’s original logic,
ours is based on a conventional Kripke semantics of

w

∀ w0 (φw
T (R(A)(w0 )) ⊆ φT (R(B)(w0 )))
modal logic. The conventional proofs of soundness
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We can readily reason for all w0 :

no models contain identical worlds, without damaging our semantics. If we know w1 = w2 , we can assume the existence of a formula σ with (w1 ∈ E(σ)) ≡
(w2 ∈ E(σ)), and conclude that w1 ∼
=U w2 (by Deﬁnition E11). Therefore, φU is bijective:

φw
T (R(A ∧ C)(w0 ))
= φw
T ((R(A) ∪ R(C))(w0 ))

= φw
T (R(A)(w0 ) ∪ R(C)(w0 ))
w
= φw
T (R(A)(w0 )) ∪ φT (R(C)(w0 ))
w
w
⊆ φT (R(B)) ∪ φT (R(C))
= φw
T (R(B)(w0 ) ∪ R(C)(w0 ))
= φw
T ((R(B) ∪ R(C))(w0 ))
= φw
T (R(B ∧ C)(w0 ))

w1 = w2 ;φU (w1 ) = φU (w2 )

2

By the deﬁnition of φ+
T it is obvious that any relation
R ∈ φ+
(R).
But
when
T = U, the converse is also
T
true:

Axiom E3. This axiom has a symmetric consequence, so we only show the ﬁrst conjunct. For all
worlds w0 ,

w0 , w1  ∈ φ+
U (R)
;∃

w1 such that w0 , w1  ∈ R,
φU (w1 ) = φU (w1 )
;w  = w
1
1

R
φw
T (R(A)(w0 )) ⊆ φT ((R(A) ∪ R(B))(w0 ))
(Lemma E27)

⊆ φR
T (R(C)(w0 ))

2

We digress to point out that we may discard “identical worlds” from a model without loss of generality. That is, imagine we have a model M with two
worlds w1 and w2 where w1 ∈ E(σ) iﬀ w2 ∈ E(σ)
for every formula σ ∈ Σ∗ . The extra world w2 appears in every I(s) that w1 appears in. Any edge in
any relation ending in w1 has a related edge ending
in w2 (w, w1  ∈ J(A) ≡ w, w2 ∈ J(A)); likewise
edges starting at w1 have a related edge starting at
w2 in every relation. The same holds for the relations in the name interpretation function K(A, N ).
It is clear that the extension function R, and hence
E, have the same overlap with respect to w1 and w2 ,
so that w1 ∈ E(σ) ≡ w2 ∈ E(σ).
Given this deﬁnition, we can build a model M =
W  , w0 , I  , J  , K   that discards w2 :
W  = W − {w2 }

w1 if w0
w0 =
w0 otherwise
I (s) = I(s) − {w2 }


∈R

Now we have φ+
U (R) = R.

U

Axiom E4. Expanding the deﬁnition of B ⇒
A and applying the previous result gives R(A) ⊆
φ+
U (R(B)) = R(B), which satisﬁes the deﬁnition of
B ⇒ A. 2
Justifying axiom Axiom E5 requires two lemmas
that relate representatives of equivalence classes under diﬀerent projections.
First, a representative of a projection due to a
small set has a “big brother” in any projection due to
a superset, and the structure of the brothers is closely
related:

w 1 ∈ φw
T  (Sw ), T ⊆ T

;∃ w
1



∈ φw
T (Sw ), w 1 = w 1 ∩ T

(Lemma E28)

Proof. By the ﬁrst premise, there is a w1 ∈ Sw where
w 1 = φT  (w1 ). From Deﬁnition E26 we know
(σ ∈ w 1 ) ≡ (w1 ∈ E(σ)) ∀ σ ∈ T 





;w , w 
0
1

(premise)

(1)

Let w 1 = φT (w1 ); since w1 ∈ Sw , w 1 ∈ φw
T (Sw ).
Having exhibited w 1 , we need only show w 1 ∩T = w 1 .
We again invoke Deﬁnition E26 to get



J (A) = J(A) − {w, w |w = w2 ∨ w = w2 }
K (A, N ) = K(A, N )
− {w, w  |w = w2 ∨ w  = w2 }


Happily, M preserves every consequence of M:
(M |= σ) ≡ (M |= σ). Why? Whenever w0 ∈ E(σ),
w0 ∈ E  (σ), either for exactly the same reasons (when
w0 = w2 ), or because w0 = w2 , so w0 = w2 ∈ E(σ) ≡
w1 ∈ E(σ), and then w0 ∈ E  (s) for the same reasons
that w1 ∈ E(s).
Convinced that duplicate worlds do not alter the
consequences of a model, we may now assume that

(σ ∈ w 1 ) ≡ (w1 ∈ E(σ)) ∀ σ ∈ T

(2)

First, σ ∈ w1 ∩ T  means both σ ∈ T  , and because
T  ⊆ T , σ ∈ T . The latter allows us to use (2)
to write w1 ∈ E(σ), and then we invoke (1) to get
σ ∈ w 1 . Conversely, σ ∈ w 1 means σ ∈ T  and hence
σ ∈ T . We apply (1) to get w1 ∈ E(σ), and apply (2)
to get σ ∈ w 1 . Now we have shown w 1 ∩ T  = w 1 ,
proving the lemma. 2
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regarding a larger set T ∗ that includes formulas constructed from the members of T . In our example,
B speaks for A regarding formulas composed exclu


w 1 ∈ φw
sively with the primitive s or the primitive t, but not
T (Sw ), w 1 = w 1 ∩ T T ⊆ T
;w  ∈ φw (S )
regarding
formulas combining the two. The closure
(Lemma E29)
w
1
T
of the restriction set S ∪ T includes formulas such as
Proof. The ﬁrst premise, by Deﬁnition E13, implies ¬(s ∧ ¬t).
the existence of a w1 ∈ R, and Deﬁnition E26 lets us
Axiom E8. Assume the premise in terms of Defwrite
inition E14:

The second lemma is approximately the converse
of the ﬁrst:

(σ ∈ w 1 ) ≡ (w1 ∈ E(σ)) ∀ σ ∈ T


w

∀ w0 (φw
T (R(A)(w0 )) ⊆ φT (R(B)(w0 )))

(1)

Let w belong to φw
T (R(C|A)(w0 )). The semantics for
quoting gives w ∈ φw
T ((R(C) ◦ R(A))(w0 )). An edge
σ∈T
(third premise) only exists in a composition if we have w1 and w2 such
(1) that w0 , w1  ∈ R(C) and w1 , w2  ∈ R(A); Deﬁni(σ ∈ w 1 ) ≡ (w1 ∈ E(σ))
tion E13 guarantees that we have such w1 , w2 with

(σ ∈ w 1 ∪ T ) ≡ (w1 ∈ E(σ))
w = φT (w2 ).

(second premise)
(σ ∈ w 1 ) ≡ (w1 ∈ E(σ))
Since w2 ∈ R(A)(w1 ), we can use the assumption
to show the existence of w2 ∈ R(B)(w1 )

This last result implies that w 1 = φT  (w1 ), which is
with φT (w2 ) = φT (w2 ) = w. That means that
suﬃcient to prove the conclusion of the lemma. 2
w ∈ φw (R(B)(w1 )), and hence w ∈ φw ((R(C) ◦
T
Axiom E5. We take as our hypothesis M |= B ⇒ R(B))(wT )). By the deﬁnition of quoting,Twe arrive
0
A, that is:
at w ∈ φw
T (R(C|B)(w0 )), which proves the conclusion.
For every σ ∈ T  , all of the following hold:

2

w
φw
T (R(A)(w0 )) ⊆ φT (R(B)(w0 ))

Result E9. The model in Figure 9 is a counterexample
for T = {s} that shows the result. Notice that
Given any world w0 and sets T ⊆ T , we assume
T


w
w 1 ∈ φT  (R(A)(w0 )) and set out to prove w 1 ∈ B ⇒ A: R(A)’s only edge goes from w0 to the equivφw
T  (R(B)(w0 )). By the assumption and Lemma E28, alence class of worlds where s is true, and R(B) also
we know
has such an edge (the loop at w0 ). When we compose
the relations, however, we see that B|C says s, but


∃ w 1 ∈ φw
T (R(A)(w0 )), w 1 = w 1 ∩ T
not A|C says s. The equivalence classes of {C says s}
are
diﬀerent than the equivalence classes of {s}.
The hypothesis gives w 1 ∈ φw
T (R(B)(w0 )), which satisﬁes the premise for Lemma E29. Hence we know
B B
w 1 ∈ φw
T  (R(B)(w0 )), and we have proven that


w
∀ w0 , (φw
T  (R(A)(w0 )) ⊆ φT  (R(B)(w0 )))

s
t

2

Theorem E6. Apply Axiom E5 twice to the
premises to get two relations restricted by S ∪T , then
apply Axiom E1 to collapse them into the relation in
the conclusion. 2
Result E7. Figure 8 gives a counterexample that
justiﬁes the result. The diagram in the ﬁgure models
S
T
S∪T
B ⇒ A and B ⇒ A. The statement B ⇒ , however,
fails. Projecting the model under S ∪ T gives the
original picture, since each world falls in a separate
equivalence class. Notice that B says ¬(s ∧ ¬t): that
statement is true in both worlds B considers possible.
But A does not believe it, since A can see the lowerleft world, where the statement is false.
Why should this result be intuitive or desirable?
T
Recall from Section 9.9 that the strength of ⇒ means
that a delegation regarding T may imply a delegation

s
t

w0
A

C

s
t

s
t
C

Figure 9: A model that demonstrates Result E9.
Axiom E10. Inductively applying Axiom E25
T
and Axiom
E24 shows as a theorem that B ⇒ A imT∗
plies B ⇒ A. Therefore, we may immediately replace
((T ∗ )C)∗

the premise of this axiom with B
⇒
A, which
follows by the theorem from the original premise.
Herein we omit the parentheses for the postﬁx set
operators ∗ and C, and simply write T ∗ C ∗ .
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A
s
t

A

s
t

w0
A

B

s
s
t
t
In this model, A’s relation at w0 is not a subset of B’s.

Projected under S =
{s}, however, the subset relation holds . . .

. . . as it does under
T = {t}.

Figure 8: A counterexample showing why two delegations for sets S and T do not imply a delegation
for set S ∪ T (Result E7).

Hence we begin with the hypothesis that
R(A) ⊆

follows that:
w1 ∈ E(¬C says ¬τ2 )

φ+
T ∗ C ∗ (R(B))

= W − E(C says ¬τ2 )
= W − {w|R(C)(w) ⊆ E(¬τ2 )}
= {w|R(C)(w) ⊆ E(¬τ2 )}
= {w|∃ w2 ∈ R(C)(w), w2 ∈ E(¬τ2 )}

We are given some w0 ∈ W and the existence of
w 2 ∈ φw
T (R(A|C)(w0 )). The set can be rewritten
φw
((R(A)
◦ R(C))(w0 )), so we know that there exT
ist w1 and w2 , where
w0 , w1  ∈ R(A)
w1 , w2  ∈ R(C)
w 2 = φT ∗ C ∗ (w2 )
The last expression means that for all σ ∈ T , σ ∈ w 2
if and only if w1 ∈ E(σ).
Deﬁne the formula

τ2 =

 
σ∈T

= {w|∃ w2 ∈ R(C)(w), w2 ∈ E(τ2 )}

That is, we know there is a w2 ∈ E(τ2 ), with
w1 , w2  ∈ R(C).
With both w0 , w1  ∈ R(B) and w1 , w2  ∈ R(C),
we have w0 , w2  ∈ R(B) ◦ R(C) = R(B|C). From the
deﬁnition of τ2 , we know that w2 is in E(σ) exactly
when σ ∈ w 2 for all σ ∈ T , so w 2 = φT (w2 ). We have
shown that w2 ∈ φw
T (R(B|C)(w0 )), and therefore that
T

given the hypothesis, the model supports B|C ⇒ A|C.

2

Axiom E17. This axiom follows from our bruteforce semantics for names. Assume the premise:

σ
¬σ

if σ ∈ w 2
otherwise

R(A) ⊆ R(B)
We want to show that

Intuitively, τ2 is true at precisely those worlds that
map to w 2 under φT . We have constructed τ2 such
that w2 ∈ E(τ2 ).

R(A · N ) ⊆ R(B · N ),

which is of course trivial thanks to requirement I of
Deﬁnition E21.
Since w1 , w2 ∈ R(C), we know R(C) ⊆ E(¬τ2 ),
Theorem E18. Since (A∧ B) ⇒ A, (A∧ B)· N ⇒
and therefore w1 ∈ E(C says ¬τ2 ), and ﬁnally w1 ∈ A · N (by Axiom E17, with T = U). The same is true
E(¬C says ¬τ2 ). The propositional closure of T en- for B, proving:
sures that each conjunct of τ2 , and thus τ2 itself
2
(A ∧ B) · N ⇒ (A · N ) ∧ (B · N )
and ¬τ2 , appear in T ∗ . The modal closure over
∗
“C says” ensures that (C says ¬τ2 ) ∈ T C, and thereAxiom E19. Requirement III of Deﬁnition E21
fore (¬C says ¬τ2 ) ∈ T ∗ C ∗ .
exists to support this axiom. It says:
Now we may employ the hypothesis to show that
R(A ∧ B) · N ⊆ R(A · N ) ∪ R(B · N )
there exists a w1 ∈ R(B)(w0 ) with w1 ∼
=T ∗ C ∗ w1 . It
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The right-hand side, by the semantics for ∧, is equal
to R((A · N ) ∧ (B · N )), completing the proof.
Theorem E20. Theorem E18 and Axiom E19
together show equality. 2
Axiom E23. Assume R(B) ⊆ E(σ  ) ;R(A) ⊆
E(σ  ) for σ  ∈ {σ, τ }. Further, assume that R(B) ⊆
E(σ ∧ τ ). Using the semantics of ∧, we can write
R(B) ⊆ E(σ) ∩ E(τ ), and hence R(B) ⊆ E(σ) and
R(B) ⊆ E(τ ). By the ﬁrst assumption, we can replace
B in both statements with A, use the deﬁnition of ∩
and the semantics of ∧, and conclude that R(A) ⊆
E(σ ∧ τ ), justifying the axiom. 2
Axiom E24. Let T = {σ, τ } and T  = {σ ∧ τ }.
Assume ﬁrst that:

w


φw
T (R(A)(w0 )) ⊆ φT (R(B)(w0 )) ∀ w0 ∈ W

Clearly σ ∈ w 1 if and only if ¬σ ∈ w 1 . Now we can
write
w1 ∈ E(σ) iﬀ σ ∈ w1
This expression satisﬁes the deﬁnition of φT , so we
have φT (w1 ) = w 1 . Because w1 ∈ R(A)(w0 ), we
know w 1 ∈ φw
T (R(A)(w0 )).
Using the ﬁrst assumption, we have w 1 ∈
φw
T (R(B)(w0 )). Using arguments analogous to those
above, we have the existence of a w1 ∈ R(B)(w0 ),
and by the deﬁnition of φT , we can show that w 1 is in
¬σ
φw
T (R(B)(w0 )) as well. The model supports B ⇒ A.

2

A.5

Relationships

among

the

re-

Second, assume we are given w0 and w 1 such that
stricted relations
w 1 ∈ φw
T  (R(A)(w0 )). We have the existence of a
In each of the examples below, assume T = {s}.
w1 ∈ R(A)(w0 ) with w 1 = φT  (w1 ).
T
T
Let w1 = φT (w1 ). By our ﬁrst assumption, w1 ∈
 is not stronger than ⇒. The subset relation
w

φT (R(B)(w0 )), so there is a w1 ∈ R(B)(w0 ) with
T
in the projected model M of ⇒ holds with the possiw 1 = φT (w1 ). We claim that φT  (w1 ) = w 1 , a claim
ble exception of the single world w T = T that represupported by leaning on the deﬁnition of φT :
sents the equivalence class of worlds in M in which all


statements
in T hold. Clearly φT takes every member
σ ∧ τ ∈ φT  (w1 ) ≡ w1 ∈ E(σ ∧ τ )
of ∩σ∈T E(σ) to that representative. The counterex

≡ w1 ∈ E(σ) ∧ w1 ∈ E(τ )
ample illustrated in Figure 10 highlights this excep≡ σ ∈ w 1 ∧ τ ∈ w1
tion.
T
T
≡ w1 ∈ E(σ) ∧ w1 ∈ E(τ )
⇒ is not stronger than . Although just
T
T
≡ w1 ∈ E(σ ∧ τ )
showed that  is not quite stronger than ⇒, it cer
≡ σ ∧ τ ∈ w1
tainly seems almost so. Indeed, it is very easy to construct an example that shows that the mighty relation
Since w 1 is either T = {σ∧τ } or ∅, we have shown the does not follow from the basic speaks-for-regarding
equality, and that w 1 ∈ φw
T  (R(B)(w0 )). Therefore relation. See Figure 11.
{σ∧τ}
T
T
the model supports B ⇒ A. 2
⇒ implies →. Assume R(A) ⊆ φ+
T (R(B)). We
Axiom E25. The structure of this proof parallels
T
will prove by contradiction that B → A. To esthat of Axiom E24. Let T = {σ} and T  = {¬σ}.
tablish a contradiction, we assume there is a stateAssume ﬁrst that:
ment σ ∈ T and a world w0 where B says σ but
not
A says σ. That is, R(B)(w0 ) ⊆ E(σ) but
w

w


φT (R(A)(w0 )) ⊆ φT (R(B)(w0 )) ∀ w0 ∈ W
R(A)(w0 ) ⊆ E(σ). The latter means that there is
Second, assume we are given w0 and w 1 such that a world w1 ∈ R(A)(w0 ), but w1 ∈ E(σ).
We can push w0 , w1 through our original assumpw 1 ∈ φw
T  (R(A)(w0 )). That implies the existence of


a w1 ∈ R(A)(w0 ), with w 1 = φT  (w1 ). By the def- tion to ﬁnd a w1 such that w0 , w1  ∈ R(B) and
 ∼

inition of φT  we know w1 ∈ E(¬σ) if and only if w1 =T w1 . Deﬁnition E11 tells us that w1 ∈ E(σ),

¬σ ∈ w 1 . Using the semantics of ¬, we can rewrite which means R(B)(w0 ) ⊆ E(σ), which contradicts
our second assumption. We may conclude that for
that expression as
all w0 ∈ W and σ ∈ T , R(B)(w0 ) ⊆ E(σ) implies
w1 ∈ E(σ) iﬀ ¬σ ∈ w1
R(A)(w0 ) ⊆ E(σ). 2
T

T

 implies →. We assume

Deﬁne

w1 =

T
∅

if w 1 = ∅
otherwise (w 1 = T  )

R(A)(w0 ) −


τ∈T
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E(τ ) ⊆ R(B)(w0 )

s
t
w

A

s
t
B

s
t

w

s
t

B

A
s

s

The set ∩s∈T E(s) is the left pair of worlds (where s is
true); the only edge belonging to R(A) terminates
in one of those worlds. Therefore, in this model,
R(A)(w) − ∩s∈T E(s) ⊆ R(B)(w), and we conclude
T

that B  A.
The mapping φT that reduces the worlds above to
equivalence classes modulo statements in T will make
this model M . φR
T (R(A)) includes an edge to the
equivalence class labeled s, but φR
T (R(B)(w)) does
T

not. Therefore, B ⇒
 A.
T

T

Figure 10: A counterexample that shows B  A does not imply B ⇒ A.

s
t

A

w

B

s
t

w
s

B

s
t

s
t

A
s

Here is a model in which from w, A considers possible
T

 A.
a world neither in R(B)(w) nor ∩s∈T E(s). So B 
Projecting the model onto T , however, shows that
R
φR
T (R(A)) and φT (R(B)) completely agree on matters
T

related to s; that is, B ⇒ A.
T

T

Figure 11: A counterexample that shows B ⇒ A does not imply B  A.

and that R(B)(w0 ) ⊆ E(σ). From the ﬁrst assumption, any world w1 ∈ R(A)(w0 ) is either in E(σ)
(let τ = σ) or in R(B)(w0 ). The former case trivially guarantees w1 ∈ E(σ), and the latter case does
so by the second assumption. We conclude that
R(A)(w0 ) ⊆ E(σ). 2
T
T
T
→ is weaker than ⇒ and → is weaker than
T

. See Figure 12 for counterexamples that illustrate
these relationships.

37

The statement (R(B)(w) ⊆ E(s)) ;(R(A)(w) ⊆
E(s)) has a false premise, making it vacuously true
w

B
A

s

in this model. Hence this model satisﬁes B → A.
The model is its own projection onto T , however,
T
and it is clear that B ⇒
 A.

(b)

This model satisﬁes B → A for the same reason as
the model in part (a). The single edge terminating
at R(A)(w), however, is in neither R(B)(w) nor

s

s
t

s
t
B

w
s
t

A

s
t

T

(a)

T

T

 A.
∩s∈T E(s), so B 
T

T

T

Figure 12: Examples that show why the relation → is weaker than ⇒ and .
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